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In this paper, we study a conditional upgrade strategy that has recently become very common in the travel
industry. After a consumer makes a reservation for a product (e.g., a hotel room), she is asked whether
she would like to upgrade her product to a higher-quality (more expensive) one at a discounted price.
The upgrade, however, is not fulfilled immediately. The firm fulfills upgrades at check-in if higher-quality
products are still available, and the upgrade fee is only charged to the consumer if she gets upgraded.
Consumers decide which product type to book and whether to accept an upgrade offer or not based on the
anticipated upgrade probability. We model the consumers’ decisions using a Poisson-arrival game framework
with incomplete information and prove the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. To further study the
firm’s optimal upgrade pricing strategy and develop managerial insights, we also analyze a fluid model which
is the asymptotic version of the stochastic model. Our numerical studies validate that our theoretical results
derived from the fluid model carry through to the stochastic model.
Our analysis identifies multiple benefits of conditional upgrades. First, the firm is able to capture more
demand by offering conditional upgrades, i.e., the consumers who value original product types lower than
the original prices but value higher-quality products higher than the discounted price with upgrades. Second,
conditional upgrades enable the firm to improve its market segmentation by inducing more consumers to
purchase higher-quality products. Third, conditional upgrades give the firm more flexibility in better match-
ing fixed capacities to stochastic demands. For a firm that is a price taker, offering conditional upgrades
is effective in compensating for the firm’s lack of ability in setting its prices optimally, and can sometimes
generate even higher revenues than being able to optimize product prices. For a firm that has the ability to
optimize product prices, conditional upgrades can generate higher revenues than dynamic pricing.
Key words : conditional upgrades; strategic consumers; travel industry; revenue management; Bayesian
Nash equilibrium; asymptotic analysis
1. Introduction
Like many other industries, a big challenge faced by the travel industry is the mismatch between
demand and supply across different types of products. In the travel industry (e.g., hotels, air-
lines, car rental companies, cruise lines), consumers usually make reservations in advance and the
products are perishable in the sense that they do not generate value for the firm after the end
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of the booking period. The capacity for each type of product is fixed, but due to the stochastic
demand across different product types over time, firms frequently find capacity of some product
types under-utilized while capacity of other product types in shortage at the end of the booking
period. Ideally, firms should be able to eliminate the demand-supply mismatch by having enough
flexibility in pricing their products. However, in reality, different industries face different constraints
in achieving flexibility to set prices.
In the hotel industry, a lot of firms lack the ability to adjust prices dynamically. Due to consumer
resistance, dynamic pricing (i.e., adjusting prices for the same product over time during the booking
period) is not as common as in the airline industry. Some hotels do not use dynamic pricing
at all but only use variable pricing (i.e., setting different nightly rates for the same room based
on expected demand but keeping the rate for a room offered on a particular night fixed during
the booking period) as their primary pricing strategy. Others use dynamic pricing for their “best
available rates” but have had a hard time convincing their consumers, especially corporate travel
buyers. For example, hotel chains would like to change prices dynamically and give large travel
accounts a negotiated discount off the dynamic best available price. However, according to the
survey by Business Travel News conducted on 221 travel buyers, more than two-thirds said that
they did not use dynamic pricing in their hotel program (Baker 2010). Instead, most travel buyers
negotiate a fixed corporate rate which does not change dynamically. 16% of travel buyers used
dynamic pricing only with select hotel chains, 9% used dynamic pricing only in low-volume markets,
and only 6% reported that their use of dynamic pricing is standard.
Even with variable pricing, hotels still face constraints on setting room rates optimally. In com-
petitive industries such as travel, firms usually have several direct competitors, hence have less
flexibility to adjust product prices as they like. Since consumers can compare prices for similar
products very easily on the Internet where online travel agencies such as Orbitz and Expedia have
provided such services, most firms providing similar products set similar prices for at least some of
their products. For example, the following three hotels all reside in Ann Arbor, Michigan: Hilton
Garden Inn, Residence Inn by Marriott, Sheraton. These are all upscale mid-priced hotels, and are
located within 1 mile from each other. Thus, they are direct competitors in the local market. As
a result, all three hotels use exactly the same (variable rather than dynamic) pricing strategy for
standard rooms (with either one king-size bed or two queen-size beds). For example, the price in
September and October 2013 was $169 for weekdays and $139 for Friday/Saturday nights.
While hotels have struggled with widespread acceptance of dynamic pricing and some are price
takers in the market, many hotels have recently adopted a new type of conditional upgrade policy.
This new strategy works in the following way. After a consumer makes a reservation, she is offered
an upgrade option which she decides whether to accept or not. If she accepts the upgrade offer,
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then she will be notified whether she gets upgraded or not during check-in. By accepting the
upgrade offer, the consumer agrees that she will pay the associated upgrade fee if her upgrade
is fulfilled by the hotel later. The hotel fulfills upgrades if there are higher-quality products still
available by the check-in date. Many of the hotels use Nor1, a leading technological company, to
offer the upgrades and decide the price of the upgrades.1 These new upgrades are different from the
upgrades historically offered by hotels where elite travelers may be upgraded for free at check-in
as part of their consumer loyalty program benefits. First, these are paid upgrades instead of free
upgrades. Second, they are conditional upgrades because a consumer does not know whether she
will be upgraded and pay the upgrade fee when she accepts an upgrade offer; the upgrades are
fulfilled conditional on the availability of higher-quality products by the check-in date. Third, they
are offered to not only elite members but also regular consumers. Fourth, instead of being offered at
check-in, the upgrades we consider are offered in advance, usually right after the original booking.
However, offering conditional upgrades may result in some consumers, who would purchase
higher-quality products when the firm does not offer conditional upgrades, deliberately booking
less expensive products as they hope to get upgraded and pay less than the original price of higher-
quality products they actually prefer. Thus, conditional upgrades have the potential to cannibalize
the higher-quality product sales. When using the conditional upgrade strategy, it is important for
the firm to carefully account for such consumer behaviors in setting upgrade prices optimally. In
this paper, we study how firms can properly manage the trade-off between the conditional upgrade
strategy’s potential benefits and potential threats such as cannibalization. More specifically, the
research questions we investigate are: 1) what is the optimal conditional upgrade pricing strategy
for the firm when consumers may deliberately choose lower-quality products with upgrades? 2)
When and why are conditional upgrades profitable/non-profitable for the firm? 3) How profitable
is the conditional upgrade strategy compared to other types of upgrade strategy as well as being
able to set product prices optimally, in particular, can it replace product price optimization and
dynamic pricing?
To answer these questions, we study a model where consumers select which product type to book
and whether or not to accept an upgrade offer based on the anticipation of future upgrade proba-
bility. Our model analyzes the upgrade policy as currently implemented by hotels and Nor1, where
upgrade prices are static over time. Our analysis indicates that conditional upgrades significantly
improve revenues of the firm by “demand expansion”, “price correction”, and “risk management”.
The conditional upgrades are “real options” that consumers purchase from the firm to be exercised
with an upgrade fee if the higher-quality products are still available by the end of the booking
1 Besides hotels, Nor1 is also expanding its business to airlines, cruise lines, car rentals.
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period. We find that this type of options expands the firm’s demand by capturing the consumers
who are not willing to pay the full price of higher-quality products but still value higher-quality
products significantly more than regular products. If the firm does not have pricing flexibility due
to competition or other industry constraints, conditional upgrades can be an instrument to correct
the firm’s original price for higher-quality products and reoptimize the firm’s demand segmen-
tation to improve demand-supply matching. Our numerical studies show that by properly using
conditional upgrades, the firm can capture at least the revenue potential from being able to opti-
mize the higher-quality product price. Interestingly, we also identify situations where conditional
upgrades can generate even higher revenues than the case where the firm can set both product
prices optimally but do not offer upgrades. This implies that conditional upgrades can compensate
for the firm’s lack of ability to set the optimal product prices by managing prices and capacities in
a more flexible way. Moreover, offering conditional upgrades generate higher revenues than offer-
ing last-minute upgrades in most cases. Thus, our paper provides an analytical justification for
“conditional” upgrades becoming more popular in travel industries. Finally, if the firm does have
the ability to set product prices optimally, then our numerical results indicate that the revenue
improvements with conditional upgrades are generally larger than the revenue improvements with
dynamic pricing. By offering conditional upgrades, the firm allocates the consumers who accept the
upgrade offers to different types of products at the end of the booking period. One of our interesting
findings is that this ex-post allocation flexibility that the firm gains with conditional upgrades is
generally more valuable than the pricing flexibility one has in dynamic pricing. Interestingly, these
observations hold true even for the case where the firm sets only a static upgrade price, indicating
that the potential of conditional upgrades to “correct” for mispricing of product prices may be
even higher when dynamic upgrade prices can be used.
2. Literature Review
Although upgrades are widely used in service industries such as travel, there is limited academic
literature that focuses on upgrades in service industries. Most of the literature studies upgrades
in the context of airlines where upgrades are offered to preferred travelers as a perk or if the
flight’s economy cabin is overbooked (see for example Karaesmen and Van Ryzin 2004). Gallego
and Stefanescu (2009) is one of a handful of papers that study upgrades in detail. They first study
free upgrades by generalizing the traditional network revenue management model (where product
prices are fixed and demands for different product types are independent) to explicitly account
for upgrades. They also study paid upgrades and find that if a primary capacity provider has
complete freedom to select prices, upgrades cannot improve profits. The result found by Gallego
and Stefanescu (2009) is based on a fluid model. By considering demand randomness, we find that
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the firm can strictly improve revenues with conditional upgrades compared to having complete
freedom to select product prices. Biyalogorsky et al. (2005) study conditional upgrades where the
upgrade fee is charged at the time of upgrade request (i.e., a consumer pays the upgrade fee even if
she does not get upgraded at the end) and find that upgrades increase the provider’s profits when
the probability of selling higher-quality units at full price is sufficiently high. The upgrade strategy
studied in Biyalogorsky et al. (2005) is similar to an industry practice where only passengers who
hold more expensive “upgradable class” tickets can be upgraded if there is available capacity at
the fulfillment time. In our paper, we analyze a more recent upgrade strategy pioneered by Nor1
for the travel industry (i.e., selling conditional upgrades where the fee is paid only if the upgrade
is fulfilled). Furthermore, unlike Gallego and Stefanescu (2009) and Biyalogorsky et al. (2005), we
model the strategic consumer behavior and analyze conditional upgrades with a Bayesian game.
The strategic consumer behavior significantly changes the insights.
There is also a stream of literature studying multi-product inventory management with provider-
driven demand substitution. Hsu and Bassok (1999), Bassok et al. (1999) study full downward
substitution where a consumer can be served by another product with superior quality. Netessine
et al. (2002), Shumsky and Zhang (2009) study single-level upgrades where consumers may be
upgraded by at most one product level. Although primarily focusing on inventory management or
capacity management, these papers also consider upgrades. The main difference from our paper is
that in these papers, the upgrade decision is entirely made by the provider and no additional fee
is charged to the consumer, while in our paper, consumers get to decide whether they would like
to be upgraded to a higher-quality product if it is still available by the end of the booking period.
Moreover, in the above papers, consumers are not strategic when making their product purchasing
decisions and do not take the future upgrade possibility into consideration, while we model this
strategic behavior of consumers.
A growing literature in operations management studies the interaction between consumers’
strategic behavior and firm’s decisions (see Netessine and Tang 2009 for a detailed review). For
example, a problem that has been extensively studied is the consumers’ deliberate waiting to pur-
chase later in anticipation of a price decrease when the firm can change prices over time (Su 2007,
Elmaghraby et al. 2008, Gallego et al. 2008, Yin et al. 2009, Levin et al. 2010, Mersereau and
Zhang 2012). Aviv and Pazgal (2008), Osadchiy and Vulcano (2010), Correa et al. (2013) model
the strategic consumers’ purchasing decisions as a game with incomplete information and assume
Poisson arrival of consumers to capture the randomness in the number of players in the game. We
adopt the same assumption to model the random arrival of consumers over time to book different
types of products. While the papers mentioned above consider a single product type and focus
on the consumers’ decision of “buy-now-or-wait”, we model a firm selling multiple substitutable
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product types and study the consumers’ decisions on which type of product to book and whether
to accept an upgrade offer or not.
Jerath et al. (2010) study the effect of strategic consumer behavior if competing firms offer last-
minute sales through opaque channels versus through direct channels. Fay and Xie (2008) study
probabilistic selling where the firm creates a probabilistic product by creating uncertainty about
the type of product that a consumer will eventually receive. In opaque and probabilistic selling,
the different product types are horizontally differentiated (i.e., differentiated based on a single
characteristic other than quality), while with conditional upgrades, the different product types
are vertically differentiated (i.e., they can be ordered according to quality). With the conditional
upgrade strategy, the provider sells an option to the consumer so that the consumer can obtain
a higher-quality product if the capacity is available at the fulfillment time. Due to the quality
difference between the product types, consumers pay an exercise fee when the upgrade option is
fulfilled, which is different from opaque and probabilistic selling. Our paper is also methodologically
different than the above papers in that we model the consumers’ booking decisions as a Bayesian
game with Poisson arrivals. In our paper, a consumer forms an expectation about the upgrade
probability based on her arrival time and the product availability information, and decides which
product type to book and whether or not to accept an upgrade offer.
3. Model
We consider a firm that sells two types of perishable products, regular and high-quality (e.g.,
standard rooms and suites in a hotel). The firm has KH high-quality products and KR regular
products. The products are consumed at time T and consumers arrive to book the products during
the booking period [0, T ]. The products are perishable in the sense that they have no value to
the firm after time T . The high-quality products are sold at price pH and the regular products
are sold at price pR (pH > pR). After a consumer books a regular product, the firm may offer an
upgrade opportunity so that the consumer can pay an additional fee p to upgrade the product
to a high-quality one if high-quality products are still available by the end of the booking period.
Although the firm does not guarantee the fulfillment of an upgrade, a consumer only needs to
pay the upgrade fee if she actually obtains an upgrade, and she is obliged to pay in this case.
The firm offers upgrades to γ proportion of consumers.2 Another interpretation is that (1− γ)
proportion of consumers are inattentive (i.e., do not consider the upgrade offer) when making their
2 In reality, travel firms sell through multiple channels and may offer conditional upgrades in selected channels only.
For example, Hilton offers conditional upgrades to consumers who book their rooms in hilton.com while it does not
offer conditional upgrades if consumers book through online travel agencies.
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purchasing decisions even if the firm offers them conditional upgrades.3 We assume, consistent with
industry practice, that if the firm does not have enough remaining high-quality products to satisfy
all consumers that have accepted the upgrade offers, these consumers are rationed randomly, that
is, the probability that a consumer gets upgraded does not depend on her booking time. The firm’s
goal is to optimally choose the upgrade price given product prices so that its revenue from selling
two types of products as well as collecting upgrade fees is maximized. As stated before, settings
where firms are price takers on product prices but can set upgrade price are common in practice. In
Section 7 where we evaluate the revenue performance of conditional upgrades, we will also consider
a firm that is not a price taker at all and demonstrate that conditional upgrades also have great
value for such a firm.
Consumers arrive to the market following a Poisson process with rate λ. Each consumer is char-
acterized by a pair of valuations (vR, vH), where vR denotes her valuation for regular products
and vH denotes her valuation for high-quality products. A consumer observes her private valu-
ations when arriving to the market. The valuations of consumers are jointly distributed in the
two-dimensional support Ω which is a finite subset of R2+. The joint probability density function
is denoted by f(vR, vH).4 By allowing a joint distribution of consumers’ valuations for different
product types, we are able to capture not only the consumers’ heterogeneity in the willingness to
pay but also their heterogeneity in the valuation differential between different product types, which
is important in making decisions regarding upgrades. Thus, the way we model consumer valuations
is more general than the traditional approach used by the market segmentation literature (e.g.,
Mussa and Rosen 1978, Moorthy and Png 1992) where consumers’ valuations for different product
types are proportional. The Poisson arrival rate, consumer valuation distribution, percentage of
consumers that are offered upgrades, and product prices and capacities are common information
for the firm and the consumers.
Consumers are strategic in the sense that a consumer booking at time t and seeing products
are still available anticipate the probability q(t) of actually obtaining an upgrade if she accepts
the upgrade offer. Consumers’ rational expectations on the upgrade probability q(t) depend on
the arrival time because we allow consumers to infer the upgrade probability from the fact that
3As studied in the recent economics literature, consumers may pay attention to part of the price, menu of products
or offerings. When a firm offers a multi-dimensional product, consumers may take only a subset of these dimensions
into consideration. This is exemplified by Spiegler (2006), where a consumer samples one price dimension from each
firm selling a product with a complicated pricing scheme (e.g., health insurance plans); Gabaix and Laibson (2006),
where some consumers do not observe the price of an add-on before choosing a firm; Armstrong and Chen (2009),
who extend the notion of “captive” consumers to those who always consider one dimension of a product but not
another (e.g., price but not quality).
4Our equilibrium analysis for the stochastic model can be generalized to time-dependent arrival rates and time-
dependent consumer valuation distributions.
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Figure 1 Consumer decision process
products have not been fully booked by time t. Figure 1 depicts the consumer decision process
and the payoffs from each possible decision. We use “H” to denote booking a high-quality product,
use “U” to denote booking a regular product and accepting an upgrade offer, use “R” to denote
booking a regular product without upgrade, and use “N” to denote not booking any product. The
consumers that are not offered upgrades choose from “H”, “R”, and “N”. Note that if p≥ pH−pR,
nobody accepts the upgrade offer because the total price to pay in order to get a high-quality
product through upgrade is at least as large as the original price for high-quality products. This is
equivalent to the case where upgrades are not offered.
The firm needs to decide when to stop selling each product type, taking into account the instant
booking levels for each product type where upgrades is considered as a unique type. Define NH(t),
NU(t), NR(t) as the demand stream booking each product type, respectively. Note that NU(t)
is the arrival process of consumers booking a regular product and accepting the upgrade offer,
and NR(t) is the arrival process of consumers booking a regular product and not accepting the
upgrade offer, hence NU(t) and NR(t) are mutually exclusive. Due to the decomposition property
of Poisson processes, NH(t), NU(t), and NR(t) are independent Poisson processes. We assume the
firm cannot “bump” consumers upon check-in (i.e., the firm has to accommodate check-in requests
of all reservation holders). The firm stops selling high-quality products when NH(t) ≥ KH and
stops selling regular products when NR(t)≥KR, that is, the firm tries to sell as many products
as possible. Moreover, the firm stops selling both product types at the same time when NH(t) +
NU(t) +NR(t)≥KH +KR. Note that this stopping rule allows the firm to accept more bookings
for regular products during the booking period than the capacity (because some of the consumers
booking regular products with upgrades may later get upgraded and free up some capacity for
regular products) while ensuring no bumping of consumers.
A consumer does not observe the firm’s instant capacities (also, how many consumers have
arrived and the booking decisions they have made) when she makes her booking decision. However,
consumers can observe whether a product type is fully booked or still available when making book-
ing decisions. As the firm stops selling some product type, consumers are restricted to fewer choices.
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When the high-quality products are unavailable, consumers can only book regular products with-
out upgrades. When the regular products are unavailable, consumers can only book high-quality
products. When both types of products are unavailable, consumers cannot book any product. We
can see that when at least one product type is unavailable, the consumer decision becomes a sim-
ple take-it-or-leave-it decision, so consumers do not anticipate the upgrade probability anymore.
Let τ denote the first time when some product type is unavailable (τ = T if the firm never stops
selling any type of product during the booking period), then τ is the (random) stopping time of
the consumer booking game that strategic consumers play regarding upgrades.
4. Consumer Booking Equilibrium
Before deriving the firm’s optimal conditional upgrade policy, we first need to analyze how strategic
consumers make their booking decisions. In this section, we derive and characterize the symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium of the consumer booking game for a given upgrade price p. Upon arrival,
a consumer observes her valuations for two product types (vR, vH) and arrival time t as well
as the availability of product types, and books the product type that maximizes her expected
utility. For a consumer that is offered an upgrade, the key to her booking decision is the expected
upgrade probability q(·) she anticipates which is a function of her booking time t. Let at(vR, vH |q(t))
denote the consumer’s utility-maximizing decision if she arrives at time t, has valuations (vR, vH),
and anticipates the upgrade probability to be q(t).5 Similarly, let a′t(vR, vH) denote the utility-
maximizing decision of a consumer that is not offered an upgrade.
Now we derive at(vR, vH |q(t)) and a′t(vR, vH). Figure 1 shows the consumers’ utilities from book-
ing different product types. The consumer’s utility from booking a high-quality product is vH−pH ,
the utility from booking a regular product without upgrade is vR − pR, the expected utility from
booking a regular product with upgrade is q(t)(vH − pR− p)+ [1− q(t)](vR− pR), the utility from
not booking any product is zero. Thus, the consumer chooses to book a high-quality product if
vH − pH ≥max{q(t)(vH − pR − p) + [1− q(t)](vR − pR), vR − pR,0}; she chooses to book a regular
product with upgrade if q(t)(vH − pR − p) + [1− q(t)](vR − pR) ≥ max{vH − pH , vR − pR,0}; she
chooses to book a regular product without upgrade if vR− pR ≥max{vH − pH , q(t)(vH − pR− p)+
[1−q(t)](vR−pR),0}; otherwise, she does not book any product. We can simplify the above decision
rule to the following:
• If p≥ pH − pR,
at(vR, vH |q(t)) =
H if vH − vR ≥ pH − pR and vH ≥ pH ,R if vH − vR < pH − pR and vR ≥ pR,N otherwise.
5We use q(·) to denote the whole function, and q(t) to denote its value at t.
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• If 0≤ p < pH − pR,
at(vR, vH |q(t)) =

H if vH − vR ≥ pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) and vH ≥ pH ,
U if p≤ vH − vR < pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) and q(t)vH + [1− q(t)]vR ≥ pR+ q(t)p,
R if vH − vR < p and vR ≥ pR,
N otherwise.
The utility-maximizing decision of consumers that are not offered upgrades, a′t(vR, vH), is same as
at(vR, vH |q(t)) with p≥ pH − pR. We next focus on consumers that are offered upgrades and find
their equilibrium strategy.
If 0 ≤ p < pH − pR, at(vR, vH |q(t)) divides Ω into four subsets. Given q(·), at(vR, vH |q(t)) is
uniquely determined for each (vR, vH) and each t, and at(vR, vH |q(t)) can be easily computed
by plugging q(t) into the equation of at(vR, vH |q(t)). Thus, we use q(·) to define the consumer’s
strategy in the booking game. The reason for using q(·) as the strategy instead of at(vR, vH |q(·))
is that the corresponding strategy space has fewer dimensions and the computational burden of
equilibrium is smaller. The strategy space is then defined as Q= {q(·) : [0, T ]→ [0,1], such that q(·)
is differentiable}. Q contains all differentiable functions of t∈ [0, T ] taking values between 0 and 1.
To find the symmetric equilibrium q∗(·), we first fix one consumer (we call this consumer the
acting consumer) and calculate the expected upgrade probability for the acting consumer if she
books a regular product and accepts an upgrade offer when all other consumers are making their
decisions based on q(·). Denote this resulting upgrade probability for the acting consumer as b(q(·)),
b(q(·)) is also a function of t. Then, q∗(·) is the solution to b(q∗(·)) = q∗(·). We can write b(q(·)) as
b(q(·)) = g(q(·))/h(q(·)), where g(q(·)) is the unconditional expected probability that a consumer
arriving at time t accepts an upgrade offer and gets upgraded at the end of the booking period,
and h(q(·)) is the probability that both product types are still available by time t. So, b(q(·)) is the
expected upgrade probability conditioning on the fact that products are still available at time t.
Now we derive g(q(·)) and h(q(·)). With a slight abuse of notation, we use NH(t|q(·)), NU(t|q(·)),
NR(t|q(·)) to denote the arrival processes of other consumers (as seen by the acting consumer)
booking each product type given that the strategy they are using is q(·). Let τ(q(·)) denote the
stopping time of the consumer booking game (i.e., the time when the firm stops selling at least one
product type) if the acting consumer chooses to book a regular product and accept an upgrade
offer and all other consumers make their booking decisions based on q(·). Then, we have
g(q(·)) = E
NH (t|q(·)),NU (t|q(·)),NR(t|q(·))
{
min
{
[KH −NH(τ(q(·))|q(·))]+
NU(τ(q(·))|q(·))+ 1 ,1
}
·1{t≤ τ(q(·))}
}
where the “+1” term represents the acting consumer, and
h(q(·)) = P(NH(t|q(·))<KH ,NR(t|q(·))<KR,NH(t|q(·))+NU(t|q(·))+NR(t|q(·))<KH +KR).
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Note that g(q(·)) and h(q(·)) are both functions of t. To completely characterize g(q(·)) and h(q(·)),
it remains to characterize NH(t|q(·)), NU(t|q(·)), NR(t|q(·)) as well as τ(q(·)).
Lemma 1. (Myerson 1998: Environmental equivalence property of games with Poisson arrivals6)
From the perspective of any one player, the arrival process of other players is also a Poisson process
with the same rate as the total arrival rate.
Lemma 1 implies that NH(t|q(·)), NU(t|q(·)), NR(t|q(·)) are indeed Poisson processes. Moreover,
they have the same distributions as the overall arrival processes. Given q(·), the probabilities of
any other consumer that is offered an upgrade booking each type of product are as follows:
ξγH(t|q(·)) =
∫∫
Ω
1{at(vR, vH |q(·)) =H}f(vR, vH)dvR dvH ,
ξγU(t|q(·)) =
∫∫
Ω
1{at(vR, vH |q(·)) =U}f(vR, vH)dvR dvH ,
ξγR(t|q(·)) =
∫∫
Ω
1{at(vR, vH |q(·)) =R}f(vR, vH)dvR dvH .
The probabilities of any other consumer that is not offered an upgrade booking each type of product
are as follows:
ξ′H(t) =
∫∫
Ω
1{a′t(vR, vH) =H}f(vR, vH)dvR dvH ,
ξ′R(t) =
∫∫
Ω
1{a′t(vR, vH) =R}f(vR, vH)dvR dvH .
Thus, the arrival rates of NH(t|q(·)), NU(t|q(·)), NR(t|q(·)) are λH(t|q(·)) = λγξγH(t|q(·)) + λ(1−
γ)ξ′H(t), λU(t|q(·)) = λγξγU(t|q(·)), λR(t|q(·)) = λγξγR(t|q(·))+λ(1− γ)ξ′R(t), respectively.
Next, we derive the stopping time τ(q(·)). Define the following auxiliary stopping times:
• τH(q(·)) = inf{t≥ 0 :NH(t|q(·))≥KH}.
• τR(q(·)) = inf{t≥ 0 :NR(t|q(·))≥KR}.
• τT (q(·)) = inf{t≥ 0 :NH(t|q(·))+NU(t|q(·))+ 1+NR(t|q(·))≥KH +KR}.
τH(q(·)) is the time when high-quality products are fully booked, τR(q(·)) is the time when regular
products are fully booked, τT (q(·)) is the time when the total demand reaches the firm’s total
6Myerson (1998) first proved the environmental equivalence property of games with Poisson arrivals. Myerson (1998)
provides a proof for the case of discrete player type set, but it is easily generalized to the case of continuous player
type set (in our problem, the player type set is continuous because we assume a continuous valuation support). We
refer the readers that are interested in theories of Poisson games to Myerson (1998), Myerson (2000) and Milchtaich
(2004).
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capacity so both product types are fully booked simultaneously. Then, the stopping time of the
consumer booking game is τ(q(·)) =min{τˆ(q(·)), T}, where
τˆ(q(·)) =min{τH(q(·)), τR(q(·)), τT (q(·))}=
 τH(q(·)) if τH(q(·))≤ τT (q(·)),τR(q(·)) if τR(q(·))≤ τT (q(·)),τT (q(·)) if τH(q(·))> τT (q(·)) and τR(q(·))> τT (q(·)).
τˆ(·) can be interpreted as the stopping time when T →∞. Note that the second equality in the
above equation follows from the fact that τH(q(·))≤ τT (q(·)) implies τH(q(·))< τR(q(·)) and that
τR(q(·))≤ τT (q(·)) implies τR(q(·))< τH(q(·)).
Theorem 1. There exists a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium q∗(·) of the consumer booking
game. q∗(·) is increasing in the arrival time of the consumer. Moreover, by equipping Q with the
uniform norm ‖q(·)‖∞ = sup0≤t≤T |q(t)|, there exists a constant α¯ such that for any q1(·), q2(·)∈Q,
we have ‖b(q1(·))− b(q2(·))‖∞ ≤ α¯‖q1(·)− q2(·)‖∞. Thus, if α¯ < 1, b(q(·)) is a contraction mapping
and the equilibrium is unique.
Theorem 1 states that the consumer booking game indeed has a symmetric pure-strategy equilib-
rium q∗(·) which is the solution to b(q∗(·)) = q∗(·). q∗(·) is an increasing function because a consumer
that arrives later and still finds both product types are available will have better knowledge that
demand has realized to be weak, and hence form a higher probability of getting upgraded. Theorem
1 also gives a sufficient condition for q∗(·) to be unique.7 However, due to the complicated structure
of our consumer booking game with Poisson arrivals, it is not possible to derive the closed-form
equilibrium or further analyze the firm’s optimal upgrade pricing policy analytically (the firm’s
revenue function is given in Appendix B). We are able to derive some interesting results about
the value of conditional upgrades in the stochastic model by focusing on special case valuation
functions for consumers (which we do in Section 7.1). However, to study conditional upgrades in
greater depth and develop more managerial and policy insights, we are going to first analyze a
fluid model which is the asymptotic version of our stochastic model (i.e., scale up the capacities
and demand rates by n and let n→∞). One may consider our fluid model as a deterministic
approximation of the stochastic model where the consumer booking game is essentially with per-
fect information. However, as verified by our numerical examples in Sections 5.3 and 6, our fluid
model is very accurate in approximating the stochastic model and the results and insights derived
from the fluid model also hold in the stochastic model. In Section 7, we study a special case of
the stochastic model analytically as well as the general stochastic model numerically, and derive
additional insights.
7 The formula of α¯ is complicated and is given in the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A. Our numerical studies
indicate that α¯ < 1 is satisfied when the product prices are far apart enough from each other and the capacity-demand
ratio is moderately large. Note that α¯ < 1 is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the equilibrium to be unique.
In our extensive numerical studies with bivariate uniform and bivariate normal valuation distributions, we do not
observe multiple equilibria to arise. In fact, as the capacities and demand rates increase proportionally to infinity,
the equilibrium is provably unique (Theorem 3).
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5. Fluid Model
In this section, we derive and analyze the fluid model. In Section 5.1, we derive the asymptotic
consumer booking equilibrium by scaling up the problem size by n and letting n→∞. In the
problem instance scaled by n, the consumer arrival rate is nλ(t) and the firm’s capacities are nKH
and nKR. For other variables, we add a subscript of n to specify the problem size. Based on Section
5.1, in Section 5.2, we study the firm’s optimal upgrade pricing strategy. In Section 5.3, we evaluate
the performance of the fluid model.
5.1. Consumer Booking Equilibrium
The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium upgrade probability in the asymptotic scenario
of the consumer booking game. As n→∞, q∗(·) converges to a constant qf , where the subscript
of f denotes the fluid model (we also use s to denote the stochastic model).
Theorem 2. (i) As n→∞, for any q(·)∈Q, the auxiliary stopping times converge to
τ∞H (q(·)) = inf
{
t≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
λH(s|q(·))ds≥KH
}
,
τ∞R (q(·)) = inf
{
t≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
λR(s|q(·))ds≥KR
}
,
τ∞T (q(·)) = inf
{
t≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
[λH(s|q(·))+λU(s|q(·))+λR(s|q(·))] ds≥KR+KH
}
,
a.s., respectively. The stopping time of the consumer booking game converges to τ∞(q(·)) =
min{τˆ∞(q(·)), T} a.s., where
τˆ∞(q(·)) =
 τ
∞
H (q(·)) if τ∞H (q(·))≤ τ∞T (q(·)),
τ∞R (q(·)) if τ∞R (q(·))≤ τ∞T (q(·)),
τ∞T (q(·)) if τ∞H (q(·))> τ∞T (q(·)) and τ∞R (q(·))> τ∞T (q(·)).
(ii) As n→∞, the equilibrium upgrade probability qn∗(·) converges pointwise to qf which is the
(time-independent) solution of the following equation:
qf =min

[
KH −
∫ τ∞(qf )
0
λH(t|qf )dt
]+
∫ τ∞(qf )
0
λU(t|qf )dt
,1
 . (1)
Our primary goal of studying the fluid model is to derive closed-form solutions which will provide
us sharp insights about how consumers make upgrading decisions and how the firm’s optimal
upgrade price depends on problem parameters. To be able to obtain closed-form solutions, we will
assume that the consumers’ valuations for two types of products are jointly uniformly distributed
in the two-dimensional support Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ u}, that is, for consumers that value
high-quality products at vH , their valuations for regular products are uniformly distributed over
[0, vH ]. u is the upper bound of consumer valuations (u > pH). Thus, the valuation support Ω is
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now an upper triangular subset of R2+, and the joint probability density is f(vR, vH) = 2/u2. Our
analysis can be easily generalized if we move Ω within R2+ to allow for different upper and lower
bounds of consumer valuations. Moreover, we have numerically tested our results when consumers’
valuations follow a bivariate normal distribution, and we find that all results in the paper (for
both the fluid model and the stochastic model) carry through to the case with bivariate normal
distribution.
Now we calculate qf by solving (1). We first need to derive the demand segmentation in the fluid
model for a given q (i.e., λH(q), λU(q), λR(q)). Figure 2 plots all five possible demand segmentations
of consumers that are offered upgrades. Throughout the paper, we use the superscript “a” through
“e” consistent with Figure 2 to specify which case we are referring to. Case a also gives the demand
segmentation of consumers that are not offered upgrades. In each ease, the proportions of consumers
booking each product type, ξH(q), ξU(q), ξR(q), can be calculated as the ratio between the area
of each region where the consumer decision is to book the corresponding product type and the
area of the entire valuation support Ω. The results are shown below. The overall demand rates are
λH(q) = λγξiH(q)+λ(1− γ)ξaH , λU(q) = λγξiU(q), λR(q) = λγξiR(q)+λ(1− γ)ξaR in Case i.
Case a If p≥ pH − pR (i.e., the firm does not offer upgrades), the consumer segmentation is
ξaH =
1
u2
(u− pH +2pR)(u− pH), ξaU = 0, ξaR =
1
u2
(pH − pR)(2u− pH − pR).
Case b If p < pH − pR (i.e., the firm offers upgrades) and q = 1, because upgrades are guaranteed
to be fulfilled, nobody books a high-quality product directly. The consumer segmentation in this
case is
ξbH = 0, ξ
b
U =
1
u2
(pR+u− p)(u− pR− p), ξbR =
1
u2
[−p2+2(u− pR)p] .
Case c If p < pH − pR and q < 1 and (pH − pR − qp)/(1− q) ≥ u, since q < 1, by booking a reg-
ular product and accepting an upgrade offer instead of booking a high-quality product directly,
a consumer risks not being upgraded and ending up consuming a regular product. Recall that a
consumer books a high-quality product directly if vH − vR ≥ (pH − pR− qp)/(1− q) and vH ≥ pH ,
where (pH − pR− qp)/(1− q) is the minimum valuation differential required to induce one to book
a high-quality product directly. If (pH − pR− qp)/(1− q)≥ u, all consumers that are interested in
high-quality products will choose to get them through upgrades. The consumer segmentation in
this case is
ξcH = 0, ξ
c
U(q) =
1
u2
[
−p
2
R
q
+(u− p)2
]
, ξcR =
1
u2
[−p2+2(u− pR)p] .
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Figure 2 Demand segmentation given the upgrade price p and the upgrade probability q: (a) no upgrades
offered, or p≥ pH − pR; (b) p < pH − pR and q= 1; (c) p < pH − pR and q < 1 and (pH − pR− qp)/(1− q)≥ u; (d)
p < pH − pR and q < 1 and pH ≤ (pH − pR− qp)/(1− q)<u; (e) p < pH − pR and q < 1 and
(pH − pR− qp)/(1− q)< pH .
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Case d If p < pH−pR and q < 1 and pH ≤ (pH−pR−qp)/(1−q)<u, since (pH−pR−qp)/(1−q)<
u, the consumers with high enough valuations for high-quality products combined with low enough
valuations for regular products will book high-quality products directly. Thus, in this case, high-
quality products are sold in both channels (i.e., directly and through upgrades). Further, depending
on whether (pH − pR− qp)/(1− q)≥ pH or not, ξH(q) and ξU(q) take different functional forms. If
(pH − pR− qp)/(1− q)≥ pH , the consumer segmentation is
ξdH(q) =
1
u2
(
u− pH − pR− qp
1− q
)2
,
ξdU(q) =
1
u2
[
−
(
pH − pR− qp
1− q
)2
+2u
(
pH − pR− qp
1− q
)
− p
2
R
q
+ p2− 2up
]
,
ξdR =
1
u2
[−p2+2(u− pR)p] .
Otherwise we are in Case e.
Case e If p < pH − pR and q < 1 and (pH − pR− qp)/(1− q)< pH , the consumer segmentation is
ξeH(q) =
1
u2
[
u+ pH − 2(pH − pR− qp)1− q
]
(u− pH),
ξeU(q) =
1
u2
· pH − pR− p
1− q · (2u− pH − pR− p),
ξeR =
1
u2
[−p2+2(u− pR)p] .
We assume KH ≥ λaHT and KR ≥ λaRT , that is, the firm’s expected demand when upgrades are
not offered does not exceed its capacity for either product type at the prices pH and pR. This
assumption is reasonable since the utilization rates in travel industries are generally not high
(according to Statista8, the average occupancy rate of the U.S. hotel lodging industry from 2000 to
2013 is only 60%). We would like to note that when the firm offers upgrades, it is still possible under
this assumption that the firm’s total capacity is fully booked before the end of the booking period,
because offering upgrades can generate more demand than the case without upgrades. Thus, our
analysis allows for any utilization level with upgrades. Moreover, our numerical analysis indicates
that all findings in this paper continue to hold even if the above assumption is not satisfied.
Theorem 3. Define
p¯ = u−
√
1
γ
[
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]
+(u− pH + pR)2,
p = pH − pR−
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
γ(u− pH + pR) ,
8 http://www.statista.com/statistics/200161/us-annual-accomodation-and-lodging-occupancy-rate.
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p′ = − 1
pR
[
KH
λT
u2−u2+2(pH − pR)u− p2H + pHpR+ p2R
]
+
1
γpR
√
γ
[
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]
·
√[
1− γ− (1− γ)KH +KR
λT
]
u2+2γ(pH − pR)u− γp2H − 2(1− γ)pHpR+ γp2R.
(i) If KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u− pH +2pR)(u− pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u− pH + pR)], qf = 1 for all 0≤ p <
pH − pR.
(ii) If KH < (λT/u2)[(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH)+γ(pH−pR)(2u−pH+pR)], the equilibrium upgrade
probability is uniquely given by the following:
• If p+ ≥ p′+ (where x+ =max{x,0}),
qf =

1 for p¯≤ p < pH − pR,
KH
λT u
2−(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH )+γ(u−pH+pR)2
γ(u−p)2 for p
+ ≤ p < p¯,
KH
λT u
2−(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH )
γ(pH−pR−p)2+KHλT u2−(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH )
for 0≤ p < p+;
• If p+ < p′+,
qf =

1 for p¯≤ p < pH − pR,
KH
λT u
2−(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH )+γ(u−pH+pR)2
γ(u−p)2 for p
′+ ≤ p < p¯,
2γ
KH
KH+KR
p2R
−β−
√
β2−4γ2 KHKH+KR p
2
R
(u−p)2
for 0≤ p < p′+,
where β = (u−pH+2pR)(u−pH)−γ(u−pH+pR)2+ KHKH+KR [2γpRp−u2+(1−γ)(2pHpR−p2R)].
(iii) qf is increasing in p.
Theorem 3 gives the equilibrium upgrade probability qf for any upgrade price p set by the
firm. If the firm’s capacity for high-quality products is very large (i.e., KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u− pH +
2pR)(u− pH)+ γ(pH − pR)(2u− pH + pR)]), consumers accepting upgrade offers are guaranteed to
get upgraded. In equilibrium, being aware of the very high chance to get upgraded, all consumers
who are interested in high-quality products and offered upgrades choose to book regular products
and accept upgrade offers. If the firm’s capacity for high-quality products is not very large (i.e.,
KH < (λT/u2)[(u − pH + 2pR)(u − pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u − pH + pR)]), the equilibrium upgrade
probability qf increases with the upgrade price p. This is because fewer consumers accept upgrade
offers when the upgrade price is higher. As the upgrade price p decreases from pH−pR to 0, as shown
by the proof of Theorem 3 (in Appendix A), the market segmentation takes the form in Cases b, c,
d, e in sequence.9 Case d or e occurs only if the upgrade price is low (i.e., 0≤ p < p+), meaning the
9 p¯ is the threshold between Case b and Case c, p is the threshold between Case c and Case d when τ∞(qf )≥ T , p′
is the threshold between Case c and Case d when τ∞(qf )<T . If p+ ≥ p′+, when Case c switches to Case d, we have
τ∞(qf )≥ T ; and vice versa. qf takes the same form in Cases d and e.
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equilibrium upgrade probability is small enough. Thus, the consumers with high enough valuations
for high-quality products and low enough valuations for low-quality products will book high-quality
products directly even if they are offered upgrades. In Case b or c, the upgrade probability is large
enough so that consumers would like to obtain high-quality products through upgrades if they are
given the offers.
5.2. Optimal Upgrade Pricing
In this section, based on the equilibrium consumer booking decision characterized in Section 5.1,
we study the firm’s optimal conditional upgrade pricing strategy. The firm’s goal is to maxi-
mize its revenue from selling both types of products and charging upgrade fees. Recall that p ≥
pH − pR corresponds to the case without upgrades. In this case, the firm’s revenue is ΠN,f =
pRλ
a
Rmin{KR/λaR, T}+ pHλaHmin{KH/λaH , T}, where the subscript of N denotes no upgrades. If
the firm offers upgrades with p < pH − pR, its revenue is
Πf (p) = pR[λU(qf )+λR]τ∞(qf )+ pλU(qf )τ∞(qf )qf + pHλH(qf )τ∞(qf )
+1{τ∞(qf ) = τ∞R (qf )}pHmin{λaH [T − τ∞(qf )],KH − [λH(qf )+λU(qf )]τ∞(qf )}
+1{τ∞(qf ) = τ∞H (qf )}pRmin{λaR[T − τ∞(qf )],KR− [λU(qf )+λR]τ∞(qf )} .
The first line of Πf (p) is the revenue collected before the consumer booking game stops. The first
term is the revenue from selling regular products (including the revenue from consumers accepting
upgrade offers), the second term is the revenue from collecting upgrade fees, the third term is the
revenue from selling high-quality products. The second line of Πf (p) is the revenue from selling
high-quality products after regular products are fully booked, where λaH [T −τ∞(qf )] is the demand
and KH − [λH(qf )+λU(qf )]τ∞(qf ) is the remaining capacity for high-quality products. The third
line of Πf (p) is the revenue from selling regular products after high-quality products are fully
booked. Since Πf (p) =ΠN,f at p= pH−pR, we limit ourselves to 0≤ p≤ pH−pR in studying Πf (p)
in the remainder of the paper. When the optimal upgrade price is achieved at p∗f = pH − pR, we
know that it is optimal for the firm not to offer upgrades.
Theorem 4. The optimal upgrade price is p∗f =min
{
max
{
(pbfoc)+, p¯
}
, pH − pR
}
, where
pbfoc =
2u−√u2+9p2R
3
.
Moreover, the optimal pricing induces qf = 1.
Theorem 4 characterizes the optimal upgrade price. The optimal upgrade price results in an
equilibrium consumer segmentation in Case b (pbfoc is the optimal price in Case b, Case b occurs
for p¯≤ p≤ pH−pR) where the upgrade probability is equal to one. Recall that Theorem 3 states qf
Cui, Duenyas, and Sahin: Pricing of Conditional Upgrades in the Presence of Strategic Consumers 19
is increasing in p (or always equal to one if the high-quality product capacity is very large). Thus,
Theorem 4 states that the firm should choose an upgrade price that is high enough. If an upgrade
price results in some consumers being rationed for upgrades, that means too many consumers are
willing to pay for the upgrades and the current upgrade price is too low. The firm should increase
the upgrade price to extract more surplus from consumers while still being able to sell out high-
quality products after fulfilling upgrades. Thus, under the optimal upgrade pricing policy, strategic
consumers who are offered upgrades purchase high-quality products through upgrades instead of
booking directly. Note that because of the deterministic feature, our fluid model captures an ideal
situation where the firm and consumers have perfect knowledge about the demand stream for each
product type. In the stochastic model, because of the demand randomness, the equilibrium upgrade
probability may not be exactly equal to one under the optimal upgrade price, so consumers with
very high valuations for high-quality products and very low valuations for regular products may
choose to book high-quality products directly even if upgrades are offered at the optimal price.
However, consistent with the insight we developed from the fluid model, in the stochastic model, the
firm should generally charge a high enough upgrade price that results in a high upgrade probability
for consumers (Tables 1 and 2 in the next subsection provide a set of examples).
5.3. Performance Evaluation of Fluid Model
We now evaluate how well the fluid model approximates the stochastic model for relatively small
values of n (we know that as n→∞, the fluid model converges to the stochastic model). In
Figure 3, we provide an illustrative example for the comparison between the consumer purchasing
equilibria in the stochastic model for different values of n and the consumer booking equilibrium
in the fluid model. For example, in Figure 3, we see that the upgrade probability in the fluid
model is 1. We also see that when n= 5, in the stochastic model, the average upgrade probability
is 0.9927. We note that in this example, n = 5 corresponds to a relatively small hotel with 60
rooms (n(KH +KR) = 60). Furthermore, in the example in Figure 3, we see that when n = 5,
the percentage of consumers that would make a different decision in the stochastic model (with
respect to which type of product to book) than in the fluid model is only 0.73%. In Tables 1 and
2, we examine the gap between the consumer booking equilibria in the stochastic model and in the
fluid model with more examples. Table 1 provides examples with different product prices, Table
2 provides examples with different product capacities. We can see that the equilibrium upgrade
probability in the stochastic model is closer to one when the product price differential is larger, or
when the high-quality product capacity is large, both indicating a smaller probability that the firm
runs out of high-quality products. Overall, we observe that the equilibrium upgrade probability is
increasing in the product price differential, and increasing in the high-quality product capacity.
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1
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q
∗(t)
n = 1
n = 5
n = 2
n = 20
n = ∞
n = 10 n E
t
[q∗(t)] Demand segmentation ∆DemandHigh Upgrade Regular
1 0.9152 9.00% 25.20% 30.19% 2.03%
2 0.9640 9.00% 25.51% 30.20% 1.72%
5 0.9927 9.00% 26.49% 29.75% 0.73%
10 0.9989 9.00% 27.02% 29.47% 0.20%
20 1 9.00% 27.21% 29.37% 0.02%
∞ 1 9.00% 27.22% 29.36% –
Figure 3 A numerical example on the asymptotic convergence of consumer booking equilibrium under the
optimal upgrade price. (λ= 1, T = 10, KH = 5, KR = 7, pH = 160, pR = 70, γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly
uniformly distributed over Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200}; “∆Demand” is defined as the expected percentage
of consumers that would make a different booking decision in the stochastic model than predicted by the fluid
model)
pH = 130 pH = 140 pH = 150 pH = 160
E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand
pR = 60 0.9879 1.34% 0.9953 0.63% 0.9985 0.24% 0.9996 0.08%
pR = 70 0.9770 2.25% 0.9898 1.21% 0.9962 0.55% 0.9989 0.20%
pR = 80 0.9615 3.42% 0.9809 2.05% 0.9919 1.06% 0.9972 0.45%
pR = 90 0.8680 23.35% 0.9685 3.11% 0.9849 1.79% 0.9939 0.88%
Table 1 Numerical examples on the gap between the consumer booking equilibria (under the optimal upgrade
price) in the stochastic model and in the fluid model with different product prices: the time-average equilibrium
upgrade probability (E
t
[q∗(t)]) and the expected percentage of consumers that would make a different booking
decision in the stochastic model than predicted by the fluid model (∆Demand). (λ= 1, T = 100, KH = 50,
KR = 70, γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
KH = 40 KH = 50 KH = 60 KH = 70
E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand
KR = 60 0.9487 3.05% 0.9919 1.06% 0.9997 0.05% 1.0000 0.00%
KR = 70 0.9487 3.06% 0.9919 1.06% 0.9997 0.05% 1.0000 0.00%
KR = 80 0.9487 3.06% 0.9919 1.06% 0.9997 0.05% 1.0000 0.00%
KR = 90 0.9487 3.06% 0.9919 1.06% 0.9997 0.05% 1.0000 0.00%
Table 2 Numerical examples on the gap between the consumer booking equilibria (under the optimal upgrade
price) in the stochastic model and in the fluid model with different product capacities: the time-average
equilibrium upgrade probability (E
t
[q∗(t)]) and the expected percentage of consumers that would make a different
booking decision in the stochastic model than predicted by the fluid model (∆Demand). (λ= 1, T = 100,
pH = 150, pR = 80, γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
Table 3 provides an illustrative example for the asymptotic convergence of the firm’s optimal
upgrade price and revenue. The derivation of the stochastic revenue function, Πs(p), is given in
Appendix B. By comparing the stochastic revenues using the optimal upgrade price derived from
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the fluid model and using the optimal upgrade price for the stochastic model, we can evaluate the
performance of the fluid model. From Table 3, we clearly see that by using the optimal upgrade
price derived from the fluid model, the firm’s revenue deviates by an almost negligible amount from
the optimal revenue in the stochastic model even for very small problem sizes (less than or equal
to 0.1% even for n= 1). The optimal upgrade price itself may have some error especially when the
problem size is small, but our numerical studies indicate that the revenue function in the stochastic
model is quite flat in the region around the optimal upgrade price, hence the deviation of the
optimal revenue is significantly smaller than the deviation of the optimal upgrade price. In Tables
4 and 5, we examine the deviation of optimal upgrade price and optimal revenue in the stochastic
model caused by the fluid solution with more examples. Table 4 provides examples with different
product prices, Table 5 provides examples with different product capacities. We can see that similar
to the observation from analyzing the consumer booking equilibrium, the optimal upgrade price
and revenue deviations caused by the fluid solution are smaller when the product price differential
is larger, or when the high-quality product capacity is larger, both indicating a smaller probability
that the firm runs out of high-quality products. Overall we observe that the pricing heuristic derived
from the fluid model performs very well in terms of giving the firm close-to-optimal revenues in
the stochastic model. Thus, by studying the fluid model, we can develop managerial insights that
will carry through to the stochastic model and provide an excellent heuristic for the stochastic
problem.
n
Fluid solution Stochastic solution ∆p∗ = |p∗f − p∗s| ∆Π∗ = Πs(p
∗
s)−Πs(p∗f )
Πs(p∗s)p∗f Πs(p∗f ) p∗s Πs(p∗s)
1 36.7 620.7 40.3 621.1 3.6 0.07%
2 36.7 1265.4 40.4 1266.4 3.7 0.08%
5 36.7 3192.2 38.4 3192.8 1.7 0.02%
10 36.7 6396.9 37.1 6397.0 0.5 0.00%
20 36.7 12798.0 36.7 12798.0 0.0 0.00%
Table 3 A numerical examples on the asymptotic convergence of optimal upgrade price and revenue. (λ= 1,
T = 10, KH = 5, KR = 7, pH = 160, pR = 70, γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over
Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
6. Analysis of Optimal Upgrade Pricing
Now that we have obtained the optimal upgrade pricing strategy, we explore it further and develop
managerial and policy insights for firms. We are first interested in when the conditional upgrade
policy increases firms’ revenues and when it can actually decrease revenues. We identify some
benefits of conditional upgrades and show that by optimally deciding when to offer upgrades and at
which price to offer upgrades, the firm benefits from offering conditional upgrades to more strategic
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pH = 130 pH = 140 pH = 150 pH = 160
∆p∗ ∆Π∗ ∆p∗ ∆Π∗ ∆p∗ ∆Π∗ ∆p∗ ∆Π∗
pR = 60 3.3 0.07% 1.6 0.01% 0.6 0.00% 0.2 0.00%
pR = 70 5.3 0.18% 2.8 0.05% 1.3 0.01% 0.5 0.00%
pR = 80 7.4 0.35% 4.5 0.14% 2.3 0.04% 1.0 0.01%
pR = 90 11.5 0.62% 6.3 0.28% 3.7 0.10% 1.8 0.02%
Table 4 Numerical examples on the gap between the firm’s optimal upgrade prices as well as revenues in the
stochastic model and in the fluid model with different product prices: the price error (∆p∗ = |p∗f − p∗s |) and the
revenue error (∆Π∗ =
Πs(p
∗
s)−Πs(p∗f )
Πs(p∗s)
). (λ= 1, T = 100, KH = 50, KR = 70, γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly
distributed over Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
KH = 40 KH = 50 KH = 60 KH = 70
∆p∗ ∆Π∗ ∆p∗ ∆Π∗ ∆p∗ ∆Π∗ ∆p∗ ∆Π∗
KR = 60 6.4 0.28% 2.3 0.04% 0.1 0.00% 0.0 0.00%
KR = 70 6.4 0.28% 2.3 0.04% 0.1 0.00% 0.0 0.00%
KR = 80 6.4 0.28% 2.3 0.04% 0.1 0.00% 0.0 0.00%
KR = 90 6.4 0.28% 2.3 0.04% 0.1 0.00% 0.0 0.00%
Table 5 Numerical examples on the gap between the firm’s optimal upgrade prices as well as revenues in the
stochastic model and in the fluid model with different product capacities: the price error (∆p∗ = |p∗f − p∗s |) and the
revenue error (∆Π∗ =
Πs(p
∗
s)−Πs(p∗f )
Πs(p∗s)
). (λ= 1, T = 100, pH = 150, pR = 80, γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly
distributed over Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
consumers. Then, we characterize when it is optimal to offer conditional upgrades for free. Finally,
we demonstrate the importance of accounting for strategic consumer behavior with conditional
upgrades by evaluating the cost of ignoring strategic consumer behavior.
6.1. When to Offer Upgrades?
The following result states when offering conditional upgrades at the optimal price increases or
decreases the firm’s revenue. For the conditional upgrade policy to be beneficial (i.e., p∗f < pH−pR),
the product price differential should be large enough. When the product price differential is small,
it is optimal not to offer upgrades (or alternatively set the upgrade price at p∗f = pH − pR).
Theorem 5. Offering conditional upgrades increases the revenue if
pH >
2u+3pR−
√
u2+9p2R
3
and decreases the revenue otherwise.
The fundamental trade-off regarding whether the firm should offer upgrades is as follows. If the
firm offers upgrades, some consumers, who book high-quality products when the firm does not offer
upgrades, will now book regular products and accept upgrade offers instead, and hence the firm’s
revenue from direct sales of high-quality products decreases. This is the cannibalization effect of
conditional upgrades. On the other hand, some consumers who book regular products when the
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firm does not offer upgrades will now accept upgrade offers; also, some consumers who do not book
any product when the firm does not offer upgrades will now purchase regular products and accept
upgrade offers (these consumers’ valuations for regular (high-quality) products are lower than pR
(pH), but their valuations for high-quality products are higher than or equal to pR+p). These two
types of consumers bring additional revenues to the firm. This is the demand improvement effect of
conditional upgrades. One important factor that determines which of these two effects is stronger
is the product price differential. If the price differential is small and the firm offers upgrades,
the cannibalization effect is significant, as a lot of consumers will book high-quality products if
the firm does not offer upgrades, and these consumers will switch to upgrades under the optimal
upgrade price (Theorem 4). Moreover, since the high-quality product price is already close to the
regular product price, there will not be many consumers who originally book regular products or
don’t book any products and now switch to upgrades, hence the demand improvement effect is not
significant. Therefore, the firm’s revenue is hurt if upgrades are offered in this case.
Thus, the firm benefits from offering conditional upgrades if the product price differential is large
enough. This finding has important implications for the companies in travel industries regarding
whether and when they should use the conditional upgrade strategy. Travel managers tend to
believe that upgrades should only be offered between similar product types, as they feel that they
may be giving consumers too much benefit by offering them the opportunity to get a product that
is much better than the originally booked type. However, this common wisdom does not take into
account the consumers’ strategic behavior that they may deliberately book a lower-quality product
than desired in anticipation of getting upgraded later. Our analysis suggests that as a response
to such strategic consumer behavior, the firm should be able to extract more revenues by offering
upgrades between product types that are priced not so closely, but also charging sufficiently large
amounts for the upgrades.
We provide the following example for the stochastic model where as the product price differential
becomes smaller, offering upgrades switches from increasing the firm’s revenue to decreasing the
firm’s revenue: λ= 1, T = 100, KH = 70, KR = 50, pR = 80, γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly
distributed over Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200}. For this example, Theorem 5 would predict
that offering upgrades benefits the firm when pH ≥ 110 and hurts the firm when pH ≤ 109. From
the numerical analysis for the stochastic model, we find that offering upgrades benefits the firm
when pH ≥ 111 and hurts the firm when pH ≤ 110, which is very close to the result indicated by
the fluid heuristic.
From our analysis above, we have seen two benefits of conditional upgrades. First, the optimal
conditional upgrade strategy can lead to demand expansion. Second, offering upgrades can shift
some consumers from regular products to high-quality products. We use the following example (in
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the stochastic model) to illustrate these two benefits of conditional upgrades: λ= 1, T = 100, KH =
70, KR = 50, pH = 150, pR = 80, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω = {(vR, vH) :
0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200}. For this example, if the firm does not offer upgrades, 26.25% of consumers
book high-quality products and 29.75% of consumers book regular products. If the firm offers
upgrades to half of the consumers (i.e., γ = 0.5), 13.13% of consumers book high-quality products
directly, 27.41% of consumers book regular products and accept the upgrade offers, and 23.09% of
consumers book regular products without upgrades. Compared to the case without upgrades where
the total demand is 56%, the firm increases the total demand to 63.63% by offering upgrades to
half of the consumers (i.e., demand expansion effect). Moreover, offering upgrades decreases the
demand for regular products from 29.75% to 23.09% and increases the demand for high-quality
products from 26.25% to 40.54% including the consumers who accept the upgrade offers (i.e.,
demand segmentation reoptimization effect). We will identify more benefits of conditional upgrades
in later sections.
Theorem 6. The optimal upgrade price and the optimal revenue are increasing in γ.
How does the firm’s revenue change with the proportion of strategic consumers it offers con-
ditional upgrades to? Theorem 6 states that the firm’s revenue becomes higher when it offers
conditional upgrades to more strategic consumers. Note that Theorem 6 incorporates the possibil-
ity that it is optimal not to offer conditional upgrades, as the optimal upgrade price and revenue
would be constant in γ in this case. For a firm that sells conditional upgrades at the optimal
upgrade price, the presence of strategic consumers is actually not a bad thing. Although strategic
consumers create the cannibalization effect of conditional upgrades, they also allow the firm to ben-
efit from demand expansion and demand segmentation reoptimization. By appropriately choosing
the upgrade price, the firm can compensate the revenue loss due to cannibalization by the revenue
gains due to the benefits of conditional upgrades and earn a higher revenue overall. Figure 4 plots
the firm’s optimal revenue in the stochastic model as a function of the proportion of strategic
consumers it offers conditional upgrades to, which is an increasing function. Therefore, given that
the upgrade price is properly chosen, the firm benefits from offering conditional upgrades to as
many consumers as possible even if consumers are strategic.
6.2. Free Upgrades
Next, we consider the extreme case where it is optimal for the firm to offer conditional upgrades
for free. As we mentioned in the beginning, the recent trend is that firms in the travel industry
are offering fewer free upgrades and introducing paid upgrades. The following theorem states that
the optimal upgrade price is zero when the regular products are very expensive (i.e., pR ≥ u/
√
3)
and the firm has such an overabundant high-quality product capacity (i.e., KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u−
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Figure 4 Firm’s optimal revenue in the stochastic model as a function of the percentage of consumers offered
upgrades. (λ= 1, T = 100, KH = 50, KR = 70, pH = 150, pR = 80, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over
Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
pH +2pR)(u− pH)+ γ(pH − pR)(2u− pH + pR)]) that it could satisfy all demand for both product
types in expectation using only the high-quality product capacity when the upgrade price is zero.
Clearly, this is a very restrictive condition and is not very likely to be satisfied in reality. Thus,
our analysis indicates that the conditional upgrades should generally be fulfilled with fees, which
is consistent with the industry trend.
Theorem 7. p∗f = 0 if and only if pR ≥ u/
√
3 and KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u − pH + 2pR)(u − pH) +
γ(pH − pR)(2u− pH + pR)].
The trade-off that the firm is managing when giving free upgrades is as follows. When upgrades
are free, the firm will get a number of consumers, who would not have booked any product at
a higher upgrade price, to book regular products and accept upgrade offers. In the mean time,
the firm will earn less revenue from consumers that would have accepted upgrade offers anyway
at a higher upgrade price. As the regular product price pR becomes higher, we can clearly see
from Figure 2b that the number of the first type of consumers discussed above becomes larger,
and the firm also earns more additional revenue from each of these consumers (at p= 0, the firm
earns pR from each consumer). However, the number of the second type of consumers discussed
above becomes smaller. Therefore, if the regular product price is high enough (i.e., pR ≥ u/
√
3),
the revenue improvement due to the first type of consumers will dominate the revenue loss due to
the second type of consumers. Moreover, as Theorem 4 states, the optimal upgrade price results
in the upgrade probability equal to one. Thus, for p= 0 to be optimal, we need the high-quality
product capacity to be larger than or equal to the expected demand for high-quality products and
upgrades, which results in KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)+ γ(pH − pR)(2u− pH + pR)].
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We provide the following example for the stochastic model where the optimal policy is to offer
free upgrades when the regular product price pR is high enough: λ= 1, T = 100, KH = 70, KR = 50,
pH = 150, γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤
200}. For this example, Theorem 7 would predict that p∗f = 0 when pR ≥ 116. We find the exact
same result for the stochastic model (p∗s = 0 if and only if pR ≥ 116).
6.3. Cost of Ignoring Strategic Consumer Behavior
Finally, we investigate how important it is for the firm to take strategic consumer behavior into
consideration when offering conditional upgrades. We measure the importance of accounting for
strategic consumer behavior by the revenue loss (in the stochastic model) if the firm mistakenly
assumes consumers are myopic while they are in fact strategic. Myopic consumers do not consider
future utilities from possibly getting upgrades and make their booking decisions in a two stages. A
myopic consumer first chooses among booking a high-quality product or booking a regular product
(ignoring the upgrade opportunity) or booking no product. In the first stage, she books a high-
quality product if vH−pH ≥max{vR−pR,0}, books a regular product if vR−pR ≥max{vH−pH ,0},
and does not book any product otherwise. If a myopic consumer books a regular product, then upon
receiving an upgrade offer, she accepts the offer if her utility from getting upgraded dominates her
utility from consuming the regular product. In the second stage, she accepts the upgrade offer if
vH−pR−p≥ vR−pR, or equivalently, vH−vR ≥ p. Table 6 gives the revenue loss results if the firm
mistakenly assumes strategic consumers are myopic. As the results indicate, the cost of ignoring
strategic consumer behavior is non-negligible and can be very significant in some cases (exceeding
10%). Across all 16 examples given in Table 6, the average revenue loss is 6.79%. According to
recent data from Sageworks which is a financial information company, the net profit margin of
U.S. hotel industry is 5% in 2013 and the five-year average margin is −1% (Biery 2014). Given
the low net profit margin in the hotel industry, the cost of ignoring strategic consumer behavior is
significant.
pH = 90 pH = 100 pH = 110 pH = 120
pR = 30 10.80% 8.45% 6.39% 4.52%
pR = 40 10.27% 8.16% 6.17% 4.40%
pR = 50 9.44% 7.57% 5.55% 3.83%
pR = 60 8.09% 6.96% 4.85% 3.19%
Table 6 Percentage revenue loss in the stochastic model if the firm prices conditional upgrades assuming
consumers are myopic while consumers are strategic. (λ= 1, T = 100, KH = 70, KR = 50, γ = 1, vR and vH are
jointly uniformly distributed over Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
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7. Revenue Performance of Conditional Upgrades
In this section, we evaluate the conditional upgrade strategy’s revenue performance. We will first
consider a firm that is a price taker on product prices but can set upgrade price, as we have
assumed so far. An interesting question is how much of the revenue potential does the conditional
upgrade strategy capture compared to setting product prices optimally? In Section 7.1, we compare
the conditional upgrade strategy to product price optimization. Our interesting finding is that
conditional upgrades as a lever can compensate for the firm’s lack of ability to optimize product
prices and even generate higher revenues than product price optimization. In Section 7.2, we
compare conditional upgrades to an alternative way of offering upgrades, in which case the firm
offers upgrades at the end of the booking period and can decide the upgrade price based on
demand realizations during the booking period. We find that the value of offering conditional
upgrades in advance and collecting consumers’ upgrading decisions in advance is in general greater
than the value of pricing flexibility for upgrades. Moreover, we will also consider a firm that is
not a price taker. As dynamic pricing would be another strategy that is naturally considered by
such a firm, in Section 7.3, we compare the revenue performance of conditional upgrades to the
revenue performance of dynamic pricing. Surprisingly, offering conditional upgrades outperforms
using dynamic pricing.
7.1. Conditional Upgrades vs Product Price Optimization
Following from our previous analysis for the fluid model, Corollary 1 states that when offering
conditional upgrades is profitable, offering conditional upgrades to all consumers (which is the
optimal strategy to offer upgrades, as shown in Theorem 6) enables the firm to capture all of the
revenue potential from optimally setting the price for high-quality products. Recall that as Theorem
4 indicates, when it is optimal to offer upgrades (i.e., when p∗f < pH − pR), consumers choose to
obtain high-quality products through upgrades, and the equilibrium outcome is equivalent to the
firm selling regular products at price pR and high-quality products at price pR + p∗f . Thus, the
high-quality product price is replaced by pR + p∗f which results in a higher revenue (note that p∗f
does not depend on pH). In this case, pR + p∗f is also the optimal high-quality product price for
a firm that is a price taker on only regular products. When it is optimal not to offer upgrades
(i.e., when p∗f = pH − pR), however, the firm may increase revenue by increasing pH . Thus, the
upgrade price can “correct” the price for high-quality products when it is sub-optimally high. This
is consistent with our finding in Section 6.1 that offering conditional upgrades can alter consumer
segmentation and shift more consumers to high-quality products. By offering upgrades, the firm
can offer a lower price for the high-quality products that is somewhat disguised.
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Corollary 1. Consider two scenarios: 1) the firm is a price taker on both product prices but
offers conditional upgrades, 2) the firm is a price taker on the regular product price but the firm
can optimize the high-quality product price, and no conditional upgrades are offered. With γ = 1,
when it is optimal to offer upgrades in the first scenario, these two scenarios result in the same
revenue.
Next, we explore what happens with stochastic demand. We first establish an analytical result
for a special case of the stochastic model. Assume consumers have homogeneous valuations, vH for
high-quality products and vR for regular products (vH ≥ pH , and vR ≥ pR). Theorem 8(i) states
that with stochastic demand, optimal upgrade pricing results in higher revenues than optimal high-
quality product pricing (ΠN,s(p∗H,s) is the revenue when the firm is a price taker on only regular
products and can set the high-quality product price optimally). When demand is stochastic and
no upgrades are allowed, if the realized demand exceeds product capacity for either type, the firm
cannot capture this excess demand. However, with upgrades, during the booking period, the firm
does not allocate the consumers who accept upgrade offers to specific product types; after demand
is fully realized, the firm then gets to allocate more of these consumers to the product type that
has weaker demand. Thus, the firm is able to better match its capacity to demand and improve
capacity utilization. Moreover, Theorem 8(ii) states that optimal upgrade pricing even results in
higher revenues than optimal pricing for both product types if the original regular product price
is not too far away from optimal (Π∗N,s is the revenue when the firm is not a price taker and can
set both product prices optimally).
Theorem 8. Consider the stochastic model with homogeneous consumer valuations.
(i) When pH > p∗H,s, we have Π∗s ≥ΠN,s(p∗H,s); moreover, Π∗s >ΠN,s(p∗H,s) if vH − p∗H,s ≥ vR− pR.
(ii) When pH > p∗H,s and pR is close enough to p∗R,s, we have Π∗s >Π∗N,s if vH − p∗H,s ≥ vR− p∗R,s.
Next, we examine our original stochastic model (with heterogeneous consumer valuations) numer-
ically. In Table 7, we compare the firm’s revenue when it is a price taker, ΠN,s, to 1) the revenue
when the firm offers upgrades at the optimal price (taking the product prices as given), Π∗s, and 2)
the revenue when the firm is a price taker on only regular products and can set the high-quality
product price optimally, ΠN,s(p∗H,s). We see that optimal upgrade pricing results in strictly higher
revenues than optimal high-quality product pricing. For example, suppose the firm is a price taker
selling regular products at price 90 and high-quality product at price 130. Suppose now that the
firm achieves flexibility to set price optimally for high-quality products. Optimizing pH results in
only a 0.13% improvement in revenue. However, if the firm keeps pH at 130, pR at 90, and offers
conditional upgrades, it increases revenue by 1.30%. In all of the examples in Table 7, the firm
is able to obtain higher revenues by offering conditional upgrades than by being able to optimize
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the high-quality product price. Thus, Table 7 clearly shows that the conditional upgrade strategy
is a very valuable form of flexibility for the firm, and in fact may be at least as valuable as the
flexibility to set price for one product type optimally.
pH = 130 pH = 140 pH = 150 pH = 160
∆Π∗s ∆ΠN,s(p∗H,s) ∆Π∗s ∆ΠN,s(p∗H,s) ∆Π∗s ∆ΠN,s(p∗H,s) ∆Π∗s ∆ΠN,s(p∗H,s)
pR = 60 4.57% 4.12% 10.44% 9.96% 18.65% 18.13% 29.75% 29.19%
pR = 70 2.93% 2.36% 8.36% 7.76% 16.28% 15.64% 27.27% 26.57%
pR = 80 1.67% 0.98% 6.58% 5.85% 14.36% 13.59% 25.43% 24.58%
pR = 90 1.30% 0.13% 4.96% 4.09% 12.67% 11.75% 23.97% 22.95%
Table 7 Percentage revenue improvements in the stochastic model from ΠN,s (i.e., the revenue from not
offering upgrades and using the given product prices) by 1) optimal upgrade pricing (∆Π∗s =
Π∗s−ΠN,s
ΠN,s
), and 2)
optimal pricing of high-quality products (∆ΠN,s(p
∗
H,s) =
ΠN,s(p
∗
H,s)−ΠN,s
ΠN,s
). (λ= 1, T = 100, KH = 50, KR = 70,
γ = 1, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
In Table 8, we go one step further and compare the firm’s revenue when it is a price taker, ΠN,s,
to 1) the revenue when the firm offers upgrades at the optimal price (taking the product prices as
given), Π∗s, and 2) the revenue when the firm is not a price taker and can set both product prices
optimally, Π∗N,s. We observe that the flexibility of conditional upgrades in better allocating capacity
to stochastic demand allows the firm to earn higher revenues than optimizing both product prices
when the regular product price that the firm is forced to offer is not too far away from optimal.
For example, if the firm is forced to offer high-quality products at price 130 and regular products
at price 100, optimizing pH and pR (the optimal product prices are p∗H,s = 129.1 and p∗R,s = 92.7)
results in only a 0.36% improvement in revenue. However, if the firm keeps pH at 130, pR at 100,
and offers conditional upgrades, it increases revenue by 2.92%. In Table 8, Π∗s >Π∗N,s for at least
90≤ pR ≤ 100. Thus, the conditional upgrade strategy is effective in capturing the revenue potential
from being able to optimize product prices. Additionally, the benefit of conditional upgrades in
matching fixed capacities to stochastic demands is more significant when the capacity-demand
mismatch without upgrades is more severe. We can see this from the examples given in Table
8. The optimal product prices in this case are p∗H,s = 129.1 and p∗R,s = 92.7. As we move pH and
pR away from optimal so that the capacity-demand mismatch becomes more severe, the revenue
improvement of conditional upgrades increases.
7.2. Conditional Upgrades vs Last-Minute Upgrades
Now we consider another type of upgrades that the firm offers to consumers at the last minute
and compare it to conditional upgrades that are offered in advance. In this case, the firm offers
upgrades at the end of the booking period (e.g., at check-in), and chooses the upgrade price after
demand realizations during the booking period. During the booking period, strategic consumers
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pH = 130 pH = 140 pH = 150 pH = 160
∆Π∗s ∆Π∗N,s ∆Π∗s ∆Π∗N,s ∆Π∗s ∆Π∗N,s ∆Π∗s ∆Π∗N,s
pR = 70 2.93% 5.29% 8.36% 10.84% 16.28% 18.95% 27.27% 30.19%
pR = 80 1.67% 1.81% 6.58% 6.72% 14.36% 14.52% 25.43% 25.61%
pR = 90 1.30% 0.16% 4.96% 4.13% 12.67% 11.78% 23.97% 22.99%
pR = 100 2.92% 0.36% 3.49% 2.73% 11.07% 10.25% 22.71% 21.80%
Table 8 Percentage revenue improvements in the stochastic model from ΠN,s (i.e., the revenue from not
offering upgrades and using the given product prices) by 1) optimal upgrade pricing (∆Π∗s =
Π∗s−ΠN,s
ΠN,s
), and 2)
optimal pricing of both product types (∆Π∗N,s =
Π∗N,s−ΠN,s
ΠN,s
). (λ= 1, T = 100, KH = 50, KR = 70, γ = 1, vR and vH
are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
choose among booking a high-quality product or booking a regular product or booking no product
based on the anticipated upgrade probabilities and prices. We use a similar (stochastic) model to
analyze last-minute upgrades; the model and analysis are described in Appendix C.
In Table 9, we compare the firm’s revenue when it is a price taker, ΠN,s, to 1) the optimal revenue
when the firm offers conditional upgrades, Π∗s, and 2) the optimal revenue when the firm offers
last-minute upgrades, Π∗LM,s. As Table 9 shows, conditional upgrades result in higher revenues than
last-minute upgrades in all cases. Across all examples given in Table 9, on average, conditional
upgrades improve the revenue by 13.08%, whereas last-minute upgrades improve the revenue by
only 2.36% (offering last-minute upgrades may even decrease the firm’s revenue in some cases).
Although last-minute upgrades give the firm more pricing flexibility (i.e., the firm can dynamically
determine the upgrade price based on demand realizations during the booking period), conditional
upgrades give the firm other advantages that appear to be more valuable. First, the firm has better
flexibility in managing capacities with conditional upgrades. By offering upgrades in advance and
letting consumers reveal their upgrading decisions in advance, the firm is able to better control
the time to stop selling each product type and improve its capacity utilizations. With last-minute
upgrades, the firm loses the ability to observe consumers’ upgrading decisions in advance, and
hence cannot improve capacity utilizations as effectively. Second, with conditional upgrades, by
committing to the upgrade price up front, the firm can induce more consumers, who would not
purchase any product without upgrades being offered, to purchase from the firm. With last-minute
upgrades, however, the demand expansion effect is weakened. Across all examples given in Table
9, on average, conditional upgrades generate 13.61% more demand than last-minute upgrades.
Additionally, with conditional upgrades, the firm can overbook regular products without having
to “bump” consumers during check-in, because by observing consumers’ upgrading decisions in
advance, the firm can overbook regular products as long as it knows that enough consumers (who
have accepted upgrade offers) can be switched to high-quality products. However, if upgrades are
offered at check-in and the firm overbooks regular products, it has the risk of having to bump some
Cui, Duenyas, and Sahin: Pricing of Conditional Upgrades in the Presence of Strategic Consumers 31
consumers. In this case, the firm chooses the upgrade price at the end of the booking period based
on its belief about the probability of consumers (who have booked regular products) accepting the
upgrade offer. It may occur that not enough consumers are actually willing to pay for the upgrades
at the price chosen by the firm, so the firm will incur penalty costs from bumping consumers. Note
that in the examples given in Table 9, the penalty cost per consumer, c, is equal to zero. So, we are
comparing the conditional upgrade revenue to an upper bound of the last-minute upgrade revenue.
pH = 130 pH = 140 pH = 150 pH = 160
∆Π∗s ∆Π∗LM,s ∆Π∗s ∆Π∗LM,s ∆Π∗s ∆Π∗LM,s ∆Π∗s ∆Π∗LM,s
pR = 60 4.57% 0.05% 10.44% 4.03% 18.65% 5.03% 29.75% 14.86%
pR = 70 2.93% −0.03% 8.36% 0.05% 16.28% 0.68% 27.27% 5.98%
pR = 80 1.67% 0.23% 6.58% −0.06% 14.36% 0.09% 25.43% 5.69%
pR = 90 1.30% 0.83% 4.96% 0.21% 12.67% −0.01% 23.97% 0.19%
Table 9 Percentage revenue improvements in the stochastic model from ΠN,s (i.e., the revenue from not
offering upgrades and using the given product prices) by 1) offering conditional upgrades (∆Π∗s =
Π∗s−ΠN,s
ΠN,s
), and
2) offering last-minute upgrades (∆Π∗LM,s =
Π∗LM,s−ΠN,s
ΠN,s
). (λ= 1, T = 100, KH = 50, KR = 70, γ = 1, c= 0, vR and
vH are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
7.3. Conditional Upgrades vs Dynamic Pricing
As we have seen, the flexibility of conditional upgrades in better allocating capacity to demand
allows a product-price-taking firm to achieve higher revenues than being able to optimize product
prices and offering last-minute upgrades in many cases. Now, suppose the firm is not a price taker
at all and can set both product prices optimally. In Table 10, we compare the firm’s revenue from
optimal product pricing, Π∗N,s, to 1) the optimal revenue from the conditional upgrade strategy
(using the optimal static product prices), Π∗s, and 2) the optimal revenue from dynamic pricing,
Π∗D,s. We use the classic multiproduct dynamic pricing model in Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) to
compute the expected revenue from optimal dynamic pricing.10 Interestingly, we find that condi-
tional upgrades generate more revenues than dynamic pricing in all examples in Table 10. The firm
gains different types of flexibility from conditional upgrades and dynamic pricing. By using dynamic
pricing, the firm can adjust the allocation of consumers to different product types by changing
product prices during the booking period. However, the firm does not have the flexibility to change
product assignments after purchase. With conditional upgrades, the firm’s product assignments of
consumers who have accepted upgrade offers are made after demand is fully realized. As Table 10
shows, the ex-post allocation flexibility created by conditional upgrades has more revenue potential
10Note that in Gallego and van Ryzin (1997), consumers do not postpone their purchases due to the anticipated
future price drops. Thus, the dynamic pricing revenue we are comparing the upgrade revenue to is an upper bound
on dynamic pricing revenues (Levin et al. 2010).
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than the pricing flexibility created by dynamic pricing. Therefore, for a firm that is not a price
taker and has the ability to set optimal static product prices, the conditional upgrade strategy can
serve as a substitute to dynamic pricing and in fact generate higher revenues.
KH = 20 KH = 30 KH = 40 KH = 50
∆Π∗s ∆Π∗D,s ∆Π∗s ∆Π∗D,s ∆Π∗s ∆Π∗D,s ∆Π∗s ∆Π∗D,s
KR = 50 6.42% 5.19% 4.02% 2.43% 3.07% 2.21% 1.95% 1.75%
KR = 60 6.42% 5.20% 4.02% 2.43% 3.07% 2.21% 1.95% 1.75%
KR = 70 6.42% 5.20% 4.02% 2.43% 3.07% 2.21% 1.95% 1.75%
KR = 80 6.42% 5.20% 4.02% 2.43% 3.07% 2.21% 1.95% 1.75%
Table 10 Percentage revenue improvements in the stochastic model from Π∗N,s (i.e., the revenue from optimal
product pricing without upgrades) by 1) optimal upgrade pricing given the optimal product prices
(∆Π∗s =
Π∗s−Π∗N,s
Π∗
N,s
), and 2) optimal dynamic pricing (∆Π∗D,s =
Π∗D,s−Π∗N,s
Π∗
N,s
). (λ= 1, T = 100, γ = 1, vR and vH are
jointly uniformly distributed over Ω= {(vR, vH) : 0≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
Even if the firm is a monopoly in the local market and can freely determine its product prices,
implementing variable pricing (i.e., charging different prices for the same product consumed at dif-
ferent times) or dynamic pricing (i.e., changing the price over time for the same product consumed
at the same time) may still create consumer dissatisfaction. Recall that many hotels are having a
hard time to convince business consumers to accept dynamic pricing. While variable pricing has
become more acceptable over time in travel-related industries, most firms still have constraints
on how much they can freely adjust prices based on demand. For example, if demand is very low
on a given day, optimal pricing for that particular day may result in the hotel setting severely
discounted prices for its rooms. But many hotels are reluctant to do that as they believe offering
rooms below certain price levels may undercut their image and damage their brand. Compared
to changing the product prices, changing the upgrade price may be a more benign strategy. The
hotel would not suffer from reputational effects as consumers would usually consider upgrades as a
benefit offered to them. Thus, overall we conclude that the conditional upgrade strategy is a very
good alternative to unconstrained variable/dynamic pricing.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the conditional upgrade policy that has become popular especially in the
travel industry. We model the consumers’ strategic behavior of anticipating the upgrade probability
when making booking decisions and derive the firm’s optimal upgrade price incorporating the
strategic consumer behavior. We find that offering conditional upgrades improves the firm’s revenue
so long as the product price differential is not too small. Thus, our paper provides conditions
on when firms will benefit from conditional upgrades. We also find that unlike the “markdown
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pricing” settings, the existence of more strategic consumers benefits the firm when the firm offers
conditional upgrades.
Moreover, we derive managerial insights about why the conditional upgrade strategy is effec-
tive in generating more revenues. First, conditional upgrades expand the firm’s demand as some
consumers, who wouldn’t buy any of the products without the upgrade option, start purchasing
when conditional upgrades are introduced. Second, the optimal upgrade pricing strategy can work
as a product price correction mechanism and reoptimize the firm’s demand segmentation. With
conditional upgrades, more consumers become willing to purchase high-quality products (includ-
ing purchasing through upgrades). This is especially helpful when the firm’s high-quality product
demand is weak. By properly offering conditional upgrades at the optimal upgrade price, the firm
can capture at least the revenue potential from optimizing the high-quality product price. Third,
the conditional upgrade strategy is one novel way of risk management. The extra flexibility created
by the upgrade channel allows the firm to better allocate its capacities across product types to
stochastic demands and improve utilization. We have seen that the conditional upgrade strategy
not only can compensate for the firm’s lack of ability in setting its product prices optimally, but
it can also result in even higher revenues than optimized product prices. If the firm already has
the ability of setting static product prices optimally, we have observed that offering conditional
upgrades can generate higher revenues than using dynamic pricing. We have also seen that con-
ditional upgrades generally outperform last-minute upgrades. Finally, we have derived a simple
fluid model which can be very effective in estimating optimal upgrade prices for the underlying
stochastic model even when overall capacity is very low.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Theorems and Lemmas
Lemma A1. For any a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3 ∈ [−1,1], we have
(i) |a1a2− b1b2| ≤ |a1− b1|+ |a2− b2|.
(ii) |a1a2a3− b1b2b3| ≤ |a1− b1|+ |a2− b2|+ |a3− b3|.
Proof of Lemma A1 (i) |a1a2− b1b2|= |a2(a1− b1)+ b1(a2− b2)| ≤ |a1− b1|+ |a2− b2|.
(ii) |a1a2a3− b1b2b3|= |a2a3(a1− b1)+ a3b1(a2− b2)+ b1b2(a3− b3)| ≤ |a1− b1|+ |a2− b2|+ |a3− b3|. ¤
Lemma A2. Let Nλ1 and Nλ2 be two Poisson variables with means λ1 and λ2, respectively. n≥ 0 is an
integer. Then, for every n, there exist αc(n), αp(n)∈ (0,1] such that
(i)
∣∣P(Nλ1 ≤ n)−P(Nλ2 ≤ n)∣∣≤ αc(n) |λ1−λ2|.
(ii)
∣∣P(Nλ1 = n)−P(Nλ2 = n)∣∣≤ αp(n) |λ1−λ2|.
Moreover, αc(n) is decreasing in n.
Proof of Lemma A2 (i) The case of n ≥ 1 is proved by Caldentey and Vulcano (2007) (Lemma A3 in
online appendix). In particular, αc(n) = P(Nn = n). When n= 0,
∣∣P(Nλ1 ≤ 0)−P(Nλ2 ≤ 0)∣∣= ∣∣e−λ1 − e−λ2∣∣≤
sup
λ>0
{e−λ} |λ1−λ2|= |λ1−λ2|, hence αc(0) = 1. It is easy to see that αc(n) ∈ (0,1]. αc(n) is decreasing in n
because αc(n+1)/αc(n) = (1+1/n)ne−1 < 1.
(ii) When n= 0, αp(n) = αc(n) = 1. When n≥ 1,∣∣P(Nλ1 = n)−P(Nλ2 = n)∣∣= ∣∣∣∣e−λ1λn1n! − e−λ2λn2n!
∣∣∣∣≤ |λ1−λ2|n! supλ>0
{∣∣∣∣ d(e−λλn)dλ
∣∣∣∣} .
We have d(e
−λλn)
dλ
= e−λλn−1(n− λ). Thus, d(e−λλn)
dλ
> 0 for 0 < λ < n and d(e
−λλn)
dλ
< 0 for λ > n. More-
over, d
2(e−λλn)
dλ2
= e−λλn−2[λ2 − 2nλ+ n(n− 1)]. Solving d2(e−λλn)
dλ2
= 0 yields λ = n−√n and λ = n+√n.
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Since d(e
−λλn)
dλ
∣∣∣
λ=0
= 0 and it follows from L’Hospital’s Rule that limλ→∞
d(e−λλn)
dλ
= 0, we know that
supλ>0
{∣∣∣ d(e−λλn)dλ ∣∣∣} is attained at either λ= n−√n or λ= n+√n. Thus,
sup
λ>0
{∣∣∣∣ d(e−λλn)dλ
∣∣∣∣}=max{e−(n−√n)(n−√n)n−1√n, e−(n+√n)(n+√n)n−1√n} ,
and hence
αp(n) =max
{
e−(n−
√
n)(n−√n)n−1√n
n!
,
e−(n+
√
n)(n+
√
n)n−1
√
n
n!
}
=
max{P(Nn−√n = n),P(Nn+√n = n)}√
n
.
It is easy to see that αp(n)∈ (0,1]. ¤
Lemma A3. For any a, b∈ [−1,1] and integer n≥ 0, we have |an− bn| ≤ n|a− b|.
Proof of Lemma A3 |an− bn|= |a− b| ·
∣∣∣∑n−1i=0 aibn−1−i∣∣∣≤ |a− b| ·∑n−1i=0 |aibn−1−i| ≤ n|a− b|. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1 In order to show the existence of q∗(·), we need to prove that the mapping b(q(·))
from Q to Q has the fixed-point property. By the Schauder-Tychonoff Fixed-Point Theorem, we need to
prove: 1) Q is convex and compact, 2) b(q(·)) is continuous. Convexity of Q is easy to verify. To prove
compactness, by the Arzela-Ascoli Theorem, we need to prove that Q is closed, bounded, and equicontinuous.
Closedness and boundedness of Q are easy to verify. To prove equicontinuity, first pick a q(·) from Q. For any
t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ], we have |q(t1)− q(t2)| ≤ sup0≤t≤T{|q′(t)|} |t1− t2|. Next, let q¯′ = supq(·)∈Q sup0≤t≤T{|q′(t)|}.
Note that q¯′ is finite because each q(·) is bounded. Then, for any ² > 0, there exists δ = ²/q¯′ such that if
|t1− t2|< δ, then for all q(·)∈Q, |q(t1)− q(t2)| ≤ q¯′|t1− t2|< ². Thus, we have proved equicontinuity of Q.
Next, we prove that b(q(·)) is a continuous mapping. In order to obtain a sufficient condition for the
uniqueness of q∗(·), we will prove a stronger result that b(q(·)) is Lipschitz continuous, that is, there exists
a constant α¯ ≥ 0 such that for any q1(·), q2(·) ∈ Q,
∥∥b(q1(·))− b(q2(·))∥∥∞ ≤ α¯∥∥q1(·)− q2(·)∥∥∞. For a given
arrival time t, we start by bounding
∣∣b(q1(·))− b(q2(·))∣∣ from above as follows:∣∣b(q1(·))− b(q2(·))∣∣= ∣∣g(q1(·))h(q2(·))− g(q2(·))h(q1(·))∣∣
h(q1(·))h(q2(·)) ≤
∣∣g(q1(·))− g(q2(·))∣∣+ ∣∣h(q1(·))−h(q2(·))∣∣
h(q1(·))h(q2(·)) , (A1)
where the inequality follows from Lemma A1(i).
We analyze (A1) part by part. We first bound the denominator of (A1) from below as follows:
h(q1(·)) ≥ P(NH(T |q1(·))<KH ,NR(T |q1(·))<KR,NH(T |q1(·))+NU(T |q1(·))+NR(T |q1(·))<KH +KR)
≥ P(Nλ(T )<KH ,Nλ(T )<KR,Nλ(T )<KH +KR)
= P (Nλ(T )<min{KH ,KR}) def== αh,
where Nλ(t) denotes the Poisson process with rate λ. The above bound is also valid for h(q2(·)), hence
h(q1(·))h(q2(·))≥ α2h. (A2)
Now, consider the numerator of (A1). To bound |h(q1(·))−h(q2(·))| from above, we can write h(q(·)) as
h(q(·)) =
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NH(t|q(·)) = iH)P(NR(t|q(·)) = iR)P(NU(t|q(·))<KH +KR− iH − iR).
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Then, we have
∣∣h(q1(·))−h(q2(·))∣∣
≤
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NR(t|q1(·)) = iR)
∣∣P(NH(t|q1(·)) = iH)P(NU(t|q1(·))<KH +KR− iH − iR)
−P(NH(t|q2(·)) = iH)P(NU(t|q2(·))<KH +KR− iH − iR)
∣∣
≤
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NR(t|q1(·)) = iR)
∣∣P(NH(t|q1(·)) = iH)−P(NH(t|q2(·)) = iH)∣∣
+
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NR(t|q1(·)) = iR)
∣∣P(NU(t|q1(·))<KH +KR− iH − iR)−P(NU(t|q2(·))<KH +KR− iH − iR)∣∣,
where the first step follows from the fact that NR(t|q(·)) does not depend on q(·), and the second step follows
from Lemma A1(i). Define ξH(t|q(·)) = γξγH(t|q(·)) + (1− γ)ξ′H(t|q(·)), ξU(t|q(·)) = γξγU(t|q(·)), ξR(t|q(·)) =
γξγR(t|q(·))+(1−γ)ξ′R(t|q(·)) as the proportions of total demand rate λ for NH(t|q(·)), NU(t|q(·)), NR(t|q(·)),
respectively. We can bound
∣∣P(NH(t|q1(·)) = iH)−P(NH(t|q2(·)) = iH)∣∣ as follows. Using Lemma A2(ii) yields∣∣P(NH(t|q1(·)) = iH)−P(NH(t|q2(·)) = iH)∣∣ ≤ αp(iH) ∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
λ[ξH(s|q1(·))− ξH(s|q2(·))] ds
∣∣∣∣
≤ αp(iH)λ
∫ t
0
∣∣ξH(s|q1(·))− ξH(s|q2(·))∣∣ds
≤ αp(iH)λT
∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞.
Similarly, We can use Lemma A2(i) to obtain
∣∣P(NU(t|q1(·))<KH +KR− iH − iR)−P(NU(t|q2(·))<KH +
KR− iH − iR)
∣∣≤ αc(KH +KR−1− iH − iR)λT∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞. Combining these two inequalities
leads to
∣∣h(q1(·))−h(q2(·))∣∣≤ αH1(t)∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞+αU1(t)∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞, where
αH1(t) = λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NR(t|q1(·)) = iR)αp(iH),
αU1(t) = λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NR(t|q1(·)) = iR)αc(KH +KR− 1− iH − iR).
We further bound αH1(t) and αU1(t) as follows:
αH1(t) = λT P(NR(t|q1(t))<KR)
KH−1∑
iH=0
αp(iH)≤ λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
αp(iH)
def== αH1.
Similarly,
αU1(t) ≤ λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NR(t|q1(·)) = iR)αc(KH − iH)
= λT P(NR(t|q1(·))<KR)
KH−1∑
iH=0
αc(KH − iH)
≤ λT
KH∑
iH=1
αc(iH)
def== αU1,
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where the first inequality follows from Lemma A2(i) that αc(n) is decreasing in n. Thus, we have obtained
that ∣∣h(q1(·))−h(q2(·))∣∣≤ αH1∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞+αU1∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞. (A3)
Next, we bound |g(q1(·))− g(q2(·))| from above. If τH(q(·))≤ τT (q(·)) and τH(q(·))≤ T , then g(q(·)) = 0.
Thus, we can write g(q(·)) as g(q(·)) = g1(q(·))+ g2(q(·))+ g3(q(·)), where
g1(q(·)) = P(τR(q(·))≤ τT (q(·)), τR(q(·))≤ T )g(q(·)|τR(q(·))≤ τT (q(·)), τR(q(·))≤ T ),
g2(q(·)) = P(τH(q(·))> τT (q(·)), τR(q(·))> τT (q(·)), τT (q(·))≤ T )
·g(q(·)|τH(q(·))> τT (q(·)), τR(q(·))> τT (q(·)), τT (q(·))≤ T ),
g3(q(·)) = P(τH(q(·))>T, τR(q(·))>T, τT (q(·))>T )g(q(·)|τH(q(·))>T, τR(q(·))>T, τT (q(·))>T ).
Now we consider each term of g(q(·)). Define mR(t|q(·)) =
∫ T
0
λξR(t|q(·))dt as the mean value function of
NR(t|q(·)). Define fτR(q(·))(t) as the probability density function of τR(q(·)), and fτT (q(·))(t) as the probability
density function of τT (q(·)). We have
fτR(q(·))(t) =
e−mR(t|q(·))[mR(t|q(·))]KR−1λξR(t|q(·))
(KR− 1)! = P(NR(t|q(·)) =KR− 1)λξR(t|q(·)),
and similarly,
fτT (q(·))(t) = P(NH(t|q(·))+NU(t|q(·))+NR(t|q(·)) =KH +KR− 2)λ [ξH(t|q(·))+ ξU(t|q(·))+ ξR(t|q(·))] .
g1(q(·)) can be written as
g1(q(·)) =
∫ T
t
fτR(q(·))(s)P(NH(s|q(·))+NU(s|q(·))≤KH − 1)ds
=
∫ T
t
P(NR(s|q(·)) =KR− 1)λξR(s|q(·))P(NH(s|q(·))+NU(s|q(·))≤KH − 1)ds.
g2(q(·)) can be written as
g2(q(·)) =
∫ T
t
fτT (q(·))(s) ·
[
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
KH − iH
KH +KR− iH − iR
·P(NH(s|q(·)) = iH ,NR(s|q(·)) = iR,NU(s|q(·)) =KH +KR− 1− iH − iR|τT (q(·)) = s)
]
ds
=
∫ T
t
P(NH(s|q(·))+NU(s|q(·))+NR(s|q(·)) =KH +KR− 2)λ [ξH(s|q(·))+ ξU(s|q(·))+ ξR(s|q(·))]
·
{
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
KH − iH
KH +KR− iH − iR
(
KH +KR− 1
iH
)(
KH +KR− 1− iH
iR
)
·
{
E
0≤r≤s
[ξH(r|q(·))]
}iH {
E
0≤r≤s
[ξR(r|q(·))]
}iR {
E
0≤r≤s
[ξU(r|q(·))]
}KH+KR−1−iH−iR}
ds.
g3(q(·)) can be written as
g3(q(·)) =
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
KH+KR−2−iH−iR∑
iU=0
P(NH(T |q(·)) = iH)P(NR(T |q(·)) = iR)
·P(NU(T |q(·)) = iU)min
{
KH − iH
iU +1
,1
}
.
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Next, notice that∣∣g(q1(·))− g(q2(·))∣∣≤ ∣∣g1(q1(·))− g1(q2(·))∣∣+ ∣∣g2(q1(·))− g2(q2(·))∣∣+ ∣∣g3(q1(·))− g3(q2(·))∣∣. (A4)
By using the same approach that is used to bound
∣∣h(q1(·)) − h(q2(·))∣∣, we can bound each term in the
right-hand side (RHS) of (A4) from above. Bounding the first term in the RHS of (A4) results in∣∣g1(q1(·))− g1(q2(·))∣∣≤ αH2∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞+αU2∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞, (A5)
where αH2 = αU2 = (λT )2αc(KH − 1). Bounding the second term in the RHS of (A4) results in∣∣g2(q1(·))− g2(q2(·))∣∣≤ αH3∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞+αU3∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞, (A6)
where
αH3 = λT
{
λTαp(KH +KR− 2)+ 1+
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
(
KH +KR− 1
iH
)(
KH +KR− 1− iH
iR
)
iH(KH − iH)
KH +KR− iH − iR
}
,
αU3 = λT
{
λTαp(KH +KR− 2)+ 1
+
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
(
KH +KR− 1
iH
)(
KH +KR− 1− iH
iR
)
(KH +KR− 1− iH − iR)(KH − iH)
KH +KR− iH − iR
}
.
Lemma A3 is used in deriving αH3 and αU3. Bounding the third term in the RHS of (A4) results in
∣∣g3(q1(·))−
g3(q2(·))
∣∣≤ αH4(t)∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞+αU4(t)∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞, where
αH4(t) = λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
KH+KR−2−iH−iR∑
iU=0
P(NR(T |q1(·)) = iR)αp(iH)min
{
KH − iH
iU +1
,1
}
,
αU4(t) = λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
KH+KR−2−iH−iR∑
iU=0
P(NR(T |q1(·)) = iR)αp(iU)min
{
KH − iH
iU +1
,1
}
.
We then have
αH4(t) ≤ λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KH+KR−2−iH∑
iU=0
αp(iH)min
{
KH − iH
iU +1
,1
}
def== αH4,
αU4(t) ≤ λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KH+KR−2−iH∑
iU=0
αp(iU)min
{
KH − iH
iU +1
,1
}
def== αU4.
Thus, we have obtained that∣∣g3(q1(·))− g3(q2(·))∣∣≤ αH4∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞+αU4∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞, (A7)
Thus, by plugging (A5), (A6), (A7) into (A4) and then plugging (A2), (A3), (A4) into (A1), we obtain∣∣b(q1(·))− b(q2(·))∣∣≤ αH∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞+αU∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞, (A8)
where
αH =
αH1+αH2+αH3+αH4
α2h
, αU =
αU1+αU2+αU3+αU4
α2h
.
Note that αH and αU do not depend on t.
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It remains to bound
∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞ and ∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞ from above. Define v¯H =
sup{vH : (vR, vH)∈Ω}, vH = inf {vH : (vR, vH)∈Ω}, v¯R = sup{vR : (vR, vH)∈Ω}, vR = inf {vR : (vR, vH)∈Ω}.
Fix t, and without loss of generality, assume q1(t)< q2(t). First, consider
∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞. We
have
ξH(t|q(t)) = γ
∫ v¯H
pH
[∫ max{vH− pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) ,vR}
vR
f(vR, vH)dvR
]
dvH +(1− γ)ξ′H(t|q(t)).
Since max
{
vH − pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) , vR
}
is decreasing in q(t), we have
∣∣ξH(t|q1(t))− ξH(t|q2(t))∣∣
= γ
∫ v¯H
pH
[∫ max{vH− pH−pR−q1(t)p1−q1(t) ,vR}
max
{
vH− pH−pR−q2(t)p1−q2(t) ,vR
} f(vR, vH)dvR
]
dvH
≤ γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)}
∫ v¯H
pH
[
max
{
vH − pH − pR− q1(t)p1− q1(t) , vR
}
−max
{
vH − pH − pR− q2(t)p1− q2(t) , vR
}]
dvH .
Define
q¯H = sup
{
0< q < 1 : vH − pH − pR− qp1− q ≥ vR
}
=
{ vH−pH+pR−vR
vH−vR−p
if vH > pH − pR+ vR,
0 otherwise.
It is easy to see that q¯H < 1, and vH − pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) ≥ vR if and only if q(t)≤ q¯H . Then,
max
{
vH − pH − pR− q1(t)p1− q1(t) , vR
}
−max
{
vH − pH − pR− q2(t)p1− q2(t) , vR
}
=
[
vH − pH − pR−min{q1(t), q¯H}p1−min{q1(t), q¯H}
]
−
[
vH − pH − pR−min{q2(t), q¯H}p1−min{q2(t), q¯H(t)}
]
=
(pH − pR− p) [min{q2(t), q¯H}−min{q1(t), q¯H}]
(1−min{q1(t), q¯H}) (1−min{q2(t), q¯H})
≤ pH − pR− p
(1− q¯H)2
[q2(t)− q1(t)] .
Thus,
∣∣ξH(t|q1(t))− ξH(t|q2(t))∣∣ ≤ γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)} (pH − pR− p) [q2(t)− q1(t)]
∫ v¯H
pH
1
(1− q¯H)2
dvH
= α′H [q2(t)− q1(t)] ,
where
α′H = γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)} (pH − pR− p)
[
(vR− pR)++
(v¯H − vR− p)3− (pH −min{vR, pR}− p)3
3(pH − pR− p)2
]
.
Note that α′H is finite because Ω is finite. Then, we have∣∣ξH(t|q1(t))− ξH(t|q2(t))∣∣≤ α′H∥∥q1(·)− q2(·)∥∥∞. (A9)
Second, consider
∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞. We have
ξU(t|q(t)) = γ
∫ v¯H
pH
[∫ vH−p
max
{
vH− pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) ,vR
} f(vR, vH)dvR
]
dvH+γ
∫ pH
pR+p
[∫ vH−p
pR+q(t)p−q(t)vH
1−q(t)
f(vR, vH)dvR
]
dvH .
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Note that we write the lower bound of the second integration as pR+p instead of vH because for vH < pR+p,
we have vH − p < pR+q(t)p−q(t)vH1−q(t) for all q(t). Since max
{
vH − pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) , vR
}
is decreasing in q(t) and
pR+q(t)p−q(t)vH
1−q(t) is decreasing in q(t) for vH ≥ pR+ p, we have
∣∣ξU(t|q1(t))− ξU(t|q2(t))∣∣ = γ ∫ v¯H
pH
[∫ max{vH− pH−pR−q1(t)p1−q1(t) ,vR}
max
{
vH− pH−pR−q2(t)p1−q2(t) ,vR
} f(vR, vH)dvR
]
dvH
+γ
∫ pH
pR+p
[∫ pR+q1(t)p−q1(t)vH
1−q1(t)
pR+q2(t)p−q2(t)vH
1−q2(t)
f(vR, vH)dvR
]
dvH
≤ α′H [q2(t)− q1(t)]+ γ
∫ pH
pR+p
[∫ pR+q1(t)p−q1(t)vH
1−q1(t)
pR+q2(t)p−q2(t)vH
1−q2(t)
f(vR, vH)dvR
]
dvH .
We can write the last integration equivalently as
γ
∫ pH
pR+p
[∫ pR+q1(t)p−q1(t)vH
1−q1(t)
pR+q2(t)p−q2(t)vH
1−q2(t)
f(vR, vH)dvR
]
dvH = γ
∫ pR
vR
[∫ vR+p+ pR−vRq1(t)
vR+p+
pR−vR
q2(t)
f(vR, vH)dvH
]
dvR.
Now we bound this integration from above case by case. Define q¯U as the solution to pR+q¯Up−q¯UvH1−q¯U = vR,
so q¯U =
pR−vR
pH−vR−p
. At q(t) = q¯U ,
pR+q(t)p−q(t)vH
1−q(t) = vR becomes the negatively-sloped diagonal of the rectangle
{(vR, vH) : vR ≤ vR ≤ pR, pR+ p≤ vH ≤ pH}.
• If q1(t)< q2(t)≤ q¯U ,
γ
∫ pH
pR+p
[∫ pR+q1(t)p−q1(t)vH
1−q1(t)
pR+q2(t)p−q2(t)vH
1−q2(t)
ft(vR, vH)dvR
]
dvH ≤ γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)}
∫ pH
pR+p
(vH − pR− p) [q2(t)− q1(t)]
[1− q1(t)] [1− q2(t)] dvH
≤ γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)} q2(t)− q1(t)
(1− q¯U)2
∫ pH
pR+p
(vH − pR− p)dvH
= α′U [q2(t)− q1(t)] ,
where
α′U = γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)} (pH − vR− p)
2
2
.
• If q¯U ≤ q1(t)< q2(t),
γ
∫ pR
vR
[∫ vR+p+ pR−vRq1(t)
vR+p+
pR−vR
q2(t)
f(vR, vH)dvH
]
dvR ≤ γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)}
∫ pR
vR
(pR− vR) [q2(t)− q1(t)]
q1(t)q2(t)
dvR
≤ γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)} q2(t)− q1(t)
q¯2U
∫ pR
vR
(pR− vR)dvR
= α′U [q2(t)− q1(t)] .
• If q1(t)< q¯U < q2(t),
γ
∫ pH
pR+p
[∫ pR+q1(t)p−q1(t)vH
1−q1(t)
pR+q2(t)p−q2(t)vH
1−q2(t)
f(vR, vH)dvR
]
dvH
= γ
∫ pH
pR+p
[∫ pR+q1(t)p−q1(t)vH
1−q1(t)
pR+q¯U p−q¯U vH
1−q¯U
f(vR, vH)dvR
]
dvH + γ
∫ pR
vR
[∫ vR+p+ pR−vRq¯U
vR+p+
pR−vR
q2(t)
f(vR, vH)dvH
]
dvR
≤ α′U [q¯U − q1(t)]+α′U [q2(t)− q¯U ]
= α′U [q2(t)− q1(t)] .
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Thus, we obtain that
∣∣ξU(t|q1(t))− ξU(t|q2(t))∣∣≤ α′U [q2(t)− q1(t)], where α′U is finite. Then, we have∣∣ξU(t|q1(t))− ξU(t|q2(t))∣∣≤ α′U∥∥q1(·)− q2(·)∥∥∞, (A10)
Finally, by plugging (A9) and (A10) into (A8), we obtain that
∣∣b(q1(·))−b(q2(·))∣∣≤ α¯∥∥q1(·)−q2(·)∥∥∞ where
α¯= αHα′H + αUα
′
U and α¯ does not depend on t. Then, we have
∥∥b(q1(·))− b(q2(·))∥∥∞ ≤ α¯∥∥q1(·)− q2(·)∥∥∞.
Therefore, we have proved the Lipschitz continuity of b(q(·)), and hence the existence of q∗(·). If α¯ < 1, b(q(·))
is a contraction mapping from Q to Q, hence q∗(·) is unique. q∗(·) is increasing in t because of the following.
For every sample path, g(q(·)) is constant in t for t≤ τ(q(·)) and is equal to zero for t > τ(q(·)). It is easy to
see that h(q(·)) is decreasing in t, hence after taking the average of g(q(·)) for each sample path, we know
that b(q(·)) is increasing in t. Therefore, the solution to b(q(·)) = q(·) must be increasing in t. The whole
proof is complete. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2 (i) For any q(·) and any t, as n→∞, by the Strong Law of Large Numbers, we have
NnH(t|q(·))
n
→
∫ t
0
λH(s|q(·))ds a.s.,
NnU (t|q(·))
n
→
∫ t
0
λU(s|q(·))ds a.s.,
NnR(t|q(·))
n
→
∫ t
0
λR(s|q(·))ds a.s..
Moreover, as n→∞, we have
τnT (q(·)) = inf {t≥ 0 :NnH(t|q(·))+NnU (t|q(·))+ 1+NnR(t|q(·))≥ nKH +nKR}
= inf
{
t≥ 0 : N
n
H(t|q(·))
n
+
NnU (t|q(·))
n
+
1
n
+
NnR(t|q(·))
n
≥KH +KR
}
→ inf
{
t≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
[λH(s|q(·))+λU(s|q(·))+λR(s|q(·))] ds≥KH +KR
}
a.s..
The convergence of τnH(q(·)) and τnR(q(·)) follows from the same approach, then the convergence of τn(q(·))
is obtained.
(ii) To derive q∞∗(·), we need to first derive g∞(q(·)) and h∞(q(·)) and then derive b∞(q(·)). First,
g∞(q(·)) = lim
n→∞ ENn
H
(t|q(·)),Nn
U
(t|q(·)),Nn
R
(t|q(·))
{
min
{
[nKH −NnH(τn(q(·))|q(·))]+
NnU (τn(q(·))|q(·))+ 1
,1
}
·1{t≤ τn(q(·))}
}
= lim
n→∞ ENn
H
(t|q(·)),Nn
U
(t|q(·)),Nn
R
(t|q(·))
{
min
{
[nKH −NnH(τ∞(q(·))|q(·))]+
NnU (τ∞(q(·))|q(·))+ 1
,1
}}
·1{t≤ τ∞(q(·))}
= lim
n→∞ ENn
H
(t|q(·)),Nn
U
(t|q(·)),Nn
R
(t|q(·))
min

[
KH − N
n
H(τ
∞(q(·))|q(·))
n
]+
Nn
U
(τ∞(q(·))|q(·))
n
+ 1
n
,1

 ·1{t≤ τ∞(q(·))}
= min

[
KH −
∫ τ∞(q(·))
0
λH(t|q(·))dt
]+
∫ τ∞(q(·))
0
λU(t|q(·))dt
,1
 ·1{t≤ τ∞(q(·))} .
Second,
h∞(q(·)) = lim
n→∞P
(
NnH(t|q(·))
n
<KH ,
NnR(t|q(·))
n
<KR,
NnH(t|q(·))
n
+
NnU (t|q(·))
n
+
NnR(t|q(·))
n
<KH +KR
)
= P
(∫ t
0
λH(s|q(·))ds <KH ,
∫ t
0
λR(s|q(·))ds <KR,
∫ t
0
[λH(s|q(·))+λU(s|q(·))+λR(s|q(·))] ds <KH +KR
)
= 1{t≤ τ∞(q(·))} .
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For t ≤ τ∞(q(·)), b∞(q(·)) is constant in t, hence so is q∞∗(·). Note that for t > τ∞(q(·)), b∞(q(·)) is not
defined. Since the upgrade probability is irrelevant in this case, without loss of generality, we let b∞(q(·))
take the same value as t≤ τ∞(q(·)) to preserve the differentiability of b∞(q(·)). It then follows that q∞∗(·) is
given by Part (ii) of the theorem. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3 With uniform valuation distribution, the formula of τˆ∞(q) in Theorem 2 reduces to
τˆ∞(q) =

KH
λH(q)
if KH
λH(q)
≤ KH+KR
λH(q)+λU (q)+λR
,
KR
λR
if KR
λR
≤ KH+KR
λH(q)+λU (q)+λR
,
KH+KR
λH(q)+λU (q)+λR
if KH
λH(q)
> KH+KR
λH(q)+λU (q)+λR
and KR
λR
> KH+KR
λH(q)+λU (q)+λR
.
(A11)
(i) qf = 1 corresponds to Case b, where qf = 1 requires KH ≥ (λbH + λbU)τ∞(1). We will show that KH ≥
(λbH + λ
b
U)τ
∞(1) is equivalent to KH ≥ (λbH + λbU)T . First, if τˆ∞(1) =KH/λbH , since KH/λbH ≥KH/λaH ≥ T ,
we have τ∞(1) = min{KH/λbH , T} = T . Second, if τˆ∞(1) = KR/λbR, since KR/λbR ≥ KR/λaR ≥ T , we have
τ∞(1) =min{KR/λbR, T}= T . Third, if τˆ∞(1) = (KH +KR)/(λbH + λbU + λbR), suppose τˆ∞(1)< T , then it is
easy to see thatKH ≥ (λbH+λbU)τ∞(1) is equivalent toKR/λbR ≤ (KH+KR)/(λbH+λbU+λbR) which contradicts
the second condition in (A11) for τˆ∞(1) = (KH+KR)/(λbH+λ
b
U+λ
b
R) to occur. Thus, we also have τ
∞(1) = T
in this case. Overall, KH ≥ (λbH+λbU)τ∞(1) is equivalent to KH ≥ (λbH+λbU)T . Since λbH+λbU is decreasing in
p, if KH ≥ (λbH+λbU)T at p= 0, that is, if KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH)+γ(pH−pR)(2u−pH+pR)],
then qf = 1 for all 0≤ p < pH − pR.
(ii) Next, consider the case of KH < (λT/u2)[(1− γ)(u− pH +2pR)(u− pH) + γ(u2 − p2R)]. We first char-
acterize when qf = 1. In Case b, solving KH = (λbH +λ
b
U)T yields p= p¯. Since (λ
b
H +λ
b
U)T is decreasing in p,
qf = 1 for p≥ p¯.
Now we derive qf for 0 ≤ p < p¯. We first derive qf for the case of τˆ∞(qf ) ≥ T and then incorporate
the case of τˆ∞(qf ) < T . When τˆ∞(qf ) ≥ T , Cases c, d, e may occur in sequence as p decreases. Since
(pH − pR − qfp)/(1− qf ) =∞> u at p= p¯, we are in Case c where (1) becomes q = [KH − λcHT ]/[λcU(q)T ].
Solving (1) yields
qf =
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)+ γ(u− pH + pR)2
γ(u− p)2 (A12)
which is increasing in p. Then, solving the condition for Case c (pH − pR − qfp)/(1− qf )≥ u yields p≥ p,
hence Case c occurs where qf is given by (A12) for p+ ≤ p < p¯ (note that p can be negative). For 0≤ p < p+,
Cases d and e may occur. In Case d, (1) becomes q= [KH −λdH(q)T ]/[λdU(q)T ]. Solving (1) yields
qf =
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
γ(pH − pR− p)2+ KHλT u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
(A13)
which is increasing in p. Then, solving the condition for Case d (pH − pR− qfp)/(1− qf )≥ pH yields
p≥ pH − pR− 1
γpR
[
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]
def== p˜.
So Case d occurs for p˜+ ≤ p < p+ and Case e occurs for 0 ≤ p < p˜+. In Case e, (1) becomes q = [KH −
λeH(q)T ]/[λ
e
U(q)T ]. Solving (1) also yields (A13). Thus, qf is given by (A13) for 0≤ p < p+.
Now, we incorporate the case of τˆ∞(qf )<T . Note that when τˆ∞(qf )<T , we must have τˆ∞(qf ) = (KH +
KR)/[λH(qf )+λU(qf )+λR] which is the last case in (A11), because τˆ∞(qf ) =KH/λH(qf ) implies qf = 0 and
τˆ∞(qf ) =KR/λR implies qf = 1. To analyze the case of τˆ∞(qf ) < T , we first show that it may only occur
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for small enough p. In Cases c, d, e, τˆ∞(qf )<T if and only if KH +KR < [λH(qf )+λU(qf )+λR]T . We will
show that when τˆ∞(qf )≥ T , KH +KR ≥ [λH(qf )+λU(qf )+λR]T for large p. Using the above derived qf , in
Case c when τˆ∞(qf )≥ T , we have
d[λcH +λ
c
U(qf )+λ
c
R]
dp
=
2γλpR
u2
[
γpR(u− p)
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)+ γ(u− pH + pR)2
− 1
]
≤ 2γλpR
u2
[
γpR(u− p)
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)+ γ(u− pH + pR)2
− 1
]
<
2γλpR
u2
[
γ(u− pH + pR)(u− p)
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)+ γ(u− pH + pR)2
− 1
]
= 0,
hence λcH + λ
c
U(qf ) + λ
c
R is decreasing in p. Denote λN(q) = λ− λH(q)− λU(q)− λR as the arrival rate of
consumers who do not book any product. In Case d, we have
λdN(qf ) =
γλp2R
u2
p
2− 2
{
pH − pR− 1γpR
[
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]}
p
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
+
1
γ
[
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]
+(pH − pR)2
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
}
,
which is a parabola whose axis of symmetry is p˜. Thus, λdN(qf ) is increasing in p, hence λ
d
H(qf )+λ
d
U(qf )+λ
d
R
is decreasing in p. In Case e, we have
λeN(qf ) =
λ
γu2
[
−KH
λT
u2+(u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)+ 2γpHpR− γp2R
]
which is a constant, hence so is λeH(qf )+λ
e
U(qf )+λ
e
R. Thus, combining the above analysis for Cases c, d, e,
we know that λH(qf ) + λU(qf ) + λR is decreasing in p for 0≤ p < p¯. This means that τˆ∞(qf )< T may only
occur for small enough p.
Next, we show that τˆ∞(qf )<T never occurs in Case d or e and may only occur in Case c. We will prove
that KH +KR ≥ [λ−λN(qf )]T at p= 0 in Cases d and e. In Case d at p= 0, we have
KH +KR− [λ−λN(qf )]T =KH +KR−λT +λT (pR
u
)2
[
1+
(pH − pR)2
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]
. (A14)
The derivative of (A14) with respect to KH is
1− p
2
R(pH − pR)2[
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]2
which is negative for λaHT ≤ KH < (λT/u2)[u2 − 2(pH − pR)u + p2H − pHpR − p2R] and positive for KH >
(λT/u2)[u2−2(pH−pR)u+p2H−pHpR−p2R]. Thus, by taking KH = (λT/u2)[u2−2(pH−pR)u+p2H−pHpR−
p2R], we obtain
(A14)≥KR− λT
u2
(pH − pR)(2u− pH − pR) =KR−λaRT ≥ 0,
hence KH +KR ≥ [λ− λdN(qf )]T at p = 0 in Case d. In Case e, note that λdN(qf ) = λeN(qf ) at p = p˜. Since
λeN(qf ) stays constant in p and λ
d
N(qf ) is increasing in p, λ
e
N(qf ) at p = 0 is larger than λ
d
N(qf ) at p = 0.
Thus, our analysis for Case d implies that KH +KR > [λ−λeN(qf )]T at p= 0 in Case e as well.
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So far, we have known that τˆ∞(qf )<T may only occur in Case c for small enough p. Now we derive qf in
this case. (1) becomes
q=
KH −λcH KH+KRλc
H
+λc
U
(q)+λc
R
λcU(q)
KH+KR
λc
H
+λc
U
(q)+λc
R
,
and can be simplified to
γ(u− p)2q2+βq+ γkp2R = 0, (A15)
where k =KH/(KH +KR). (A15) is a quadratic equation. Now we show that the smaller root q = [−β +√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2]/[2γ(u−p)2] is infeasible because it yields (pH−pR−qp)/(1−q)<u which contradicts
the condition for Case c to occur. With q= [−β+√β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2]/[2γ(u−p)2], we can simplify (pH−
pR−qp)/(1−q)<u to
√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 >−β−2γ(u−p)(u−pH+pR). If −β−2γ(u−p)(u−pH+pR)<
0,
√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 >−β−2γ(u−p)(u−pH+pR) is trivially satisfied. If −β−2γ(u−p)(u−pH+pR)≥
0, by taking square on both sides of
√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 >−β− 2γ(u− p)(u− pH + pR) and rearranging
terms, we obtain −β(u−pH+pR)−γ(u−pH+pR)2(u−p)−γkp2R(u−p)≥ 0. Since −β ≥ 2γ(u−p)(u−pH+
pR), we have −β(u− pH + pR)− γ(u− pH + pR)2(u− p)− γkp2R(u− p)≥ γ(u− p)[(u− pH + pR)2− kp2R]> 0.
So, q= [−β+√β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2]/[2γ(u− p)2] always leads to (pH − pR− qp)/(1− q)<u. Thus, in Case
c when τˆ∞(qf )<T , the equilibrium qf is given by the larger root of (A15):
qf =
−β+√β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
2γ(u− p)2 =
2γkp2R
−β−√β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 . (A16)
To show that qf is increasing in p, we need to show that −β−
√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 is decreasing in p. The
derivative of −β−√β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 with respect to p is
−2γkpR√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
[√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2+β+2γpR(u− p)
]
. (A17)
If β+2γpR(u− p)≥ 0, (A17)≤ 0 trivially. If β+2γpR(u− p)< 0, we have
(A17) ≤ −2γkpR√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
[√
β2− 4γ2p2R(u− p)2+β+2γpR(u− p)
]
=
−2γkpR√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
√
−β− 2γpR(u− p)
[√
−β+2γpR(u− p)−
√
−β− 2γpR(u− p)
]
≤ 0.
Thus, qf is increasing in p in Case c when τˆ∞(qf )<T .
Finally, we characterize the threshold p in Case c where τˆ∞(qf ) ≥ T switches to τˆ∞(qf ) < T . When
τˆ∞(qf )≥ T , KH +KR = [λcH +λcU(qf )+λcR]T can be simplified to
γp2Rp
2+2γpR
[
KH
λT
u2−u2+2(pH − pR)u− p2H + pHpR+ p2R
]
p
+
[
KH +KR
λT
u2−u2+2(1− γ)pHpR+ γp2R
][
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]
+ γp2R(pH − pR)2 = 0. (A18)
(A18) is a quadratic equation whose smaller root is always negative and larger root (which may also be
negative) is p′. Therefore, by combining all our analysis above, we conclude the following. If p+ ≥ p′+, we
always have τˆ∞(qf )≥ T for 0≤ p < p¯; Case c occurs for p+ ≤ p < p¯ where qf is given by (A12), and Case d
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or e occurs for 0≤ p < p+ where qf is given by (A13). If p+ < p′+, Case c always occurs for 0≤ p < p¯ and qf
is given by (A12) for p′+ ≤ p < p¯ and (A16) for 0≤ p < p′+. Finally, all previous analysis indicates that qf is
the unique solution to (1).
(iii) In the proof of Part (ii), we have shown that qf is increasing in p in all cases. ¤
Proof of Theorem 4 If KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH)+γ(pH−pR)(2u−pH+pR)], we have qf = 1
for all 0≤ p≤ pH − pR, and as found in the proof of Theorem 3(i), τ∞(1) = T . Thus, the revenue function
is Πf (p) = pRγλ(ξbR+ ξ
b
U)T + pγλξ
b
UT +(1− γ)ΠN,f = (γλT/u2) [p3− 2up2+(u2− 3p2R)p+u2pR− p3R] + (1−
γ)ΠN,f . The first-order condition is 3p2 − 4up+ u2 − 3p2R = 0. The larger root of this quadratic equation is
(2u+
√
u2+9p2R)/3 which is larger than u; the smaller root is pbfoc. Thus, Πf (p) is increasing in p for p < p
b
foc
and decreasing in p for p > pbfoc; the optimal upgrade price is min
{
(pbfoc)
+, pH − pR
}
.
Next, consider the case of KH < (λT/u2)[(u − pH + 2pR)(u − pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u − pH + pR)].
For p¯ ≤ p ≤ pH − pR, we have qf = 1, hence our proof above indicates that the local optimum is
min
{
max
{
(pbfoc)
+, p¯
}
, pH − pR
}
. For 0≤ p < p¯, we have 0< qf < 1 and
Πf (p) =
{
pR[λiU(qf )+λ
i
R] + pλ
i
U(qf )qf + pHλ
i
H(qf )
}
min
{
KH +KR
λiH(qf )+λiU(qf )+λiR
, T
}
,
where i= c, d, e as we may be in Case c, d, or e. We will show that Πf (p) is increasing in p for 0≤ p < p¯,
thus the global optimal upgrade price is also p∗ =min
{
max
{
(pbfoc)
+, p¯
}
, pH − pR
}
.
First, consider Case c. If (KH +KR)/[λcH +λ
c
U(qf )+λ
c
R]≥ T , the revenue function becomes
Πf (p) = pRγλ[ξcU(qf )+ ξ
c
R]T + p[KH − (1− γ)λξaHT ] + (1− γ)ΠN,f
=
γλT
u2
K˜H
γλT
u2+ p2R
{
−p3Rp2+
[
(
K˜H
γλT
)2u4− K˜H
γλT
p2Ru
2+2p3Ru− 2p4R
]
p+
K˜H
γλT
pRu
4
}
+(1− γ)ΠN,f ,
where K˜H =KH − (1− γ)λξaHT . So, Πf (p) is concave in p. Solving the first-order condition
dΠf
dp
=
γλT
u2
K˜H
γλT
u2+ p2R
[
−2p3Rp+(
K˜H
γλT
)2u4− K˜H
γλT
p2Ru
2+2p3Ru− 2p4R
]
= 0
yields
p=
1
2
(
K˜H
γλT
)2
u4
p3R
− 1
2
K˜H
γλT
u2
pR
+u− pR def== pcfoc.
Πf (p) is increasing in p for p < pcfoc and decreasing in p for p > p
c
foc. Next, we show p
c
foc > p¯ so that Πf (p) is
always increasing in p in Case c. pcfoc > p¯ is equivalent to√
K˜H
γλT
u2+ p2R >−
1
2
(
K˜H
γλT
)2
u4
p3R
+
1
2
K˜H
γλT
u2
pR
+ pR. (A19)
If K˜H/(γλT )> 2(pR/u)2, the RHS of (A19) is negative so (A19) holds. If K˜H/(γλT )≤ 2(pR/u)2, after taking
square on both sides, (A19) can be simplified to K˜H/(γλT )< 3(pR/u)2. Thus, (A19) always holds.
If (KH +KR)/[λcH +λ
c
U(qf )+λ
c
R]<T in Case c, the revenue function becomes
Πf (p) = pRγλ[ξcU(qf )+ ξ
c
R]τ
∞(qf )+ pγλcU(qf )τ
∞(qf )qf + pH(1− γ)λξaHτ∞(qf )+ pR(1− γ)λξaRτ∞(qf )
= pR(KH +KR)+ pKH +(1− γ)(pH − pR− p)λξaHτ∞(qf ),
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where the last equality follows from using τ∞(qf ) = (KH +KR)/{γλ[ξcU(qf ) + ξcR] + (1− γ)λ(ξaH + ξaR)} and
qf = [KH − (1− γ)λξaHτ∞(qf )]/[γλξcU(qf )τ∞(qf )]. The derivative of Πf (p) is
dΠf
dp
=KH − (1− γ)λξaHτ∞(qf )−
(1− γ)γ(pH − pR− p)λξaHτ∞(qf ) d[ξ
c
U (qf )+ξ
c
R]
dp
γ[ξcU(qf )+ ξcR] + (1− γ)(ξaH + ξaR)
.
Now we show that ξcU(qf )+ ξ
c
R is decreasing in p and hence
dΠf
dp
≥KH − (1− γ)λξaHτ∞(qf )≥KH −λξaHT ≥ 0.
Using the qf in (A16), we obtain
ξcU(qf )+ ξ
c
R =
1
u2
[
u2− 2pRp+ β+
√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
2γk
]
,
where k=KH/(KH +KR). Then,
d[ξcU(qf )+ ξ
c
R]
dp
=
pR
u2
[
β+2γpR(u− p)√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
− 1
]
,
and d[ξcU(qf )+ξ
c
R]/dp≤ 0 can be simplified to −β+
√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 ≥ 2γpR(u−p). Note that the fea-
sibility condition for Case c, (pH−pR−qfp)/(1−qf )≥ u, can be simplified to −β+
√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 ≥
2γ(u−p)(u−pH+pR). Since 2γ(u−p)(u−pH+pR)> 2γpR(u−p), −β+
√
β2− 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 ≥ 2γpR(u−p)
is true in Case c. Thus, Πf (p) is increasing in p.
We have shown that Πf (p) is increasing in Case c. Second, consider Case d. As proved in Theorem 3(ii),
we must have (KH +KR)/[λiH(qf )+λ
i
U(qf )+λ
i
R]≥ T for i= d, e. The revenue function in Case d is
Πf (p) = pRγλ[ξdU(qf )+ ξ
d
R]T + p[KH − γλξdH(qf )T − (1− γ)λξaHT ] + pHγλξdH(qf )T +(1− γ)ΠN,f
= γλTpR+(K˜H − 2γλTp
2
R
u2
)p+
γλT
u2

[
−(u− pH + pR)p+(1− K˜HγλT )u2− (pH − pR)u− p2R
]2
pH − pR− p
−
p3R
[
p2− 2(pH − pR)p− (1− K˜HγλT )u2+2(pH − pR)u+ p2R
]
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2+2(pH − pR)u− p2H +2pHpR
+(1− γ)ΠN,f .
Taking derivatives yields
dΠf
dp
= K˜H − 2γλTp
2
R
u2
+
γλT
u2
−(u− pH + pR)2+
[
(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2− 2(pH − pR)u+ p2H − 2pHpR
]2
(pH − pR− p)2
+
2p3R(pH − pR− p)
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2+2(pH − pR)u− p2H +2pHpR
}
,
d2Πf
dp2
=
2γλT
u2

[
(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2− 2(pH − pR)u+ p2H − 2pHpR
]2
(pH − pR− p)3 −
p3R
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2+2(pH − pR)u− p2H +2pHpR
 .
Since the second-order derivative is increasing in p and is equal to zero at p= p˜, d2Πf/dp2 ≥ 0 and Πf (p) is
convex in p in Case d. Moreover, we have
dΠf
dp
∣∣∣∣
p=p˜
=
γλT
u2
[
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2+2(pH − pR)u− p2H +2pHpR
]
=KH −λaHT ≥ 0.
48 Cui, Duenyas, and Sahin: Pricing of Conditional Upgrades in the Presence of Strategic Consumers
Thus, Πf (p) is increasing in p in Case d.
Third, consider Case e. The revenue function in Case e is
Πf (p) = pRγλ[ξeU(qf )+ ξ
e
R]T + p[KH − γλξeH(qf )T − (1− γ)λξaHT ] + pHγλξeH(qf )T +(1− γ)ΠN,f
=
γλT
u2
{[
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2+2(pH − pR)u− p2H +2pHpR
]
p
+pH(u2− p2H)− (2u− 2pH − pR)
[
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2+2(pH − pR)u+ p2R
]}
+(1− γ)ΠN,f .
Since
dΠf
dp
=
γλT
u2
[
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2+2(pH − pR)u− p2H +2pHpR
]
≥ 0,
Πf (p) is increasing in p in Case e.
Therefore, we conclude that if KH < (λT/u2)[(1− γ)(u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH) + γ(u2 − p2R)], the optimal
upgrade price is p∗f = min
{
max
{
(pbfoc)
+, p¯
}
, pH − pR
}
which induces qf = 1. Finally, note that p¯ ≤ 0 if
KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(1−γ)(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH)+γ(u2−p2R)], so we can always write the optimal upgrade price
as p∗f =min
{
max
{
(pbfoc)
+, p¯
}
, pH − pR
}
. ¤
Proof of Theorem 5 Offering upgrades increases the revenue if p∗f < pH −pR and decreases the revenue if
p∗f = pH − pR. p∗f = pH − pR if and only if max
{
pbfoc, p¯
}≥ pH − pR. Since KH ≥ λaHT , we have p¯≤ pH − pR.
Thus, p∗f = pH − pR if and only if pbfoc ≥ pH − pR or equivalently, pH ≤
(
2u+3pR−
√
u2+9p2R
)
/3. ¤
Proof of Theorem 6 First, consider the monotonicity of p∗f in γ. Since p
b
foc and pH−pR are independent of
γ, we only need to show that p¯ is increasing in γ. This is true becauseKH/(λT ) ·u2−(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH) =
u2/(λT ) · (KH −λaHT )≥ 0.
Second, consider the monotonicity of Πf (p∗f ) in γ. When p
∗
f = p
b
foc, using the revenue function in Case b,
the Envelope Theorem yields
dΠf (p∗f )
dγ
=
λT
u2
[
3(pbfoc)
2− 4upbfoc+u2− 3p2R
]−ΠN,f > 0,
because p∗f = p
b
foc (so p
∗
f 6= pH−pR) implies Πf (pbfoc)>ΠN,f which is equivalent to (λT/u2)[3(pbfoc)2−4upbfoc+
u2− 3p2R]>ΠN,f . Next, when p∗f = p¯, dΠf (p∗f )/dγ ≥ 0 can be simplified to
2γ2
√
1
γ
[
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]
+(u− pH + pR)2
·(u− pH + pR)(u2− 2pHu+2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR− 2p2R) ≥ a1γ2+ b1γ+ c1, (A20)
where
a1 = 2(u− pH + pR)2(u2− 2pHu+2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR− 2p2R),
b1 =
[
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]
(u2− 2pHu+2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR− 2p2R),
c1 = −
[
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]2
.
We show (A20) indeed holds as follows. If u2 − 2pHu + 2pRu + p2H − 2pHpR − 2p2R ≤ 0, we have a1 ≤ 0,
b1 ≤ 0, c1 ≤ 0, and hence the RHS of (A20) ≤ 0. Since the left-hand side (LHS) of (A20) ≥ 0, (A20) holds. If
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u2− 2pHu+2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR− 2p2R > 0, RHS can be both positive and negative. If RHS≤ 0, again (A20)
holds. If RHS> 0, by taking square on both sides and rearranging terms, (A20) is equivalent to[
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]2
(a2γ2+ b2γ+ c2)≥ 0, (A21)
where
a2 = 3(u2− 2pHu+2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR+2p2R)(u2− 2pHu+2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR− 2p2R),
b2 = 2
[
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]
(u2− 2pHu+2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR− 2p2R),
c2 = −
[
KH
λT
u2− (u− pH +2pR)(u− pH)
]2
.
It is easy to see that a2 >a1, b2 ≥ b1, c2 = c1. Thus, RHS> 0 implies that (A21) is satisfied. We have proved
that Πf (p∗f ) is increasing in γ when p
∗
f = p¯. Finally, when p
∗
f = pH − pR or p∗f = 0, Πf (p∗f ) is constant in γ.
Therefore, we conclude that Πf (p∗f ) is increasing in γ overall. ¤
Proof of Theorem 7 If KH < (λT/u2)[(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH)+γ(pH−pR)(2u−pH+pR)], we have p¯ > 0,
hence p∗f > 0. If KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u− pH + pR)], we have p¯≤ 0, hence
p∗f = 0 if and only if p
b
foc ≤ 0 which is simplified to u≤
√
3pR. ¤
Proof of Theorem 8 We only prove Part (i) of the theorem; Part (ii) follows from Part (i). First, consider
the case of vH − p∗H,s ≥ vR − pR, so that when the firm does not offer upgrades but can optimize the high-
quality product price, consumers book high-quality products. Suppose the firm offers upgrades at price
p = p∗H,s − pR. Since vH − p∗H,s ≥ vR − pR, consumers’ utility from booking regular products and accepting
upgrade offers, q∗(t)[vH−pR− (p∗H,s−pR)]+[1−q∗(t)](vR−pR), dominates their utility from booking regular
products without upgrades, vR − pR. If vH − pH < vR − pR, consumers book regular products and accept
upgrade offers. In this case, we have
Π∗s ≥ Πs(p∗H,s− pR)
=
∞∑
i=0
P(N(T ) = i)
{
[pR+(p∗H,s− pR)]min{i,KH}+ pRmin{(i−KH)+,KR}
}
>
∞∑
i=0
P(N(T ) = i)p∗H,smin{i,KH}
= ΠN,s(p∗H,s).
If vH − pH ≥ vR − pR, consumers may book high-quality products, or book regular products and accept
upgrade offers. Since q∗(t) is increasing in t (Theorem 1), there exists a threshold arrival time t¯ such that
consumers arriving before time t¯ book high-quality products, and consumers arriving after time t¯ book
regular products and accept upgrade offers. In this case, we have
Π∗s ≥ Πs(p∗H,s− pR)
=
KH−1∑
iH=0
P(N(t¯) = iH)
{
pHiH +
∞∑
iU=0
P(N(T − t¯) = iU)
[
p∗H,smin{iU ,KH − iH}+ pRmin{iU − (KH − iH),KR}
]}
+
∞∑
iH=KH
P(N(t¯) = iH)pHKH
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>
KH−1∑
iH=0
P(N(t¯) = iH)
{
p∗H,siH +
∞∑
iU=0
P(N(T − t¯) = iU)
[
p∗H,smin{iU ,KH − iH}+ pRmin{iU − (KH − iH),KR}
]}
+
∞∑
iH=KH
P(N(t¯) = iH)p∗H,sKH
>
KH−1∑
iH=0
[
P(N(t¯) = iH)p∗H,siH +
∞∑
iU=0
P(N(T − t¯) = iU)p∗H,smin{iU ,KH − iH}
]
+
∞∑
iH=KH
P(N(t¯) = iH)p∗H,sKH
=
KH−1∑
iH=0
∞∑
iU=0
P(N(t¯) = iH)P(N(T − t¯) = iU)p∗H,smin{iH + iU ,KH}+
∞∑
iH=KH
P(N(t¯) = iH)p∗H,sKH
=
∞∑
iH=0
∞∑
iU=0
P(N(t¯) = iH)P(N(T − t¯) = iU)p∗H,smin{iH + iU ,KH}
=
∞∑
i=0
P(N(T ) = i)p∗H,smin{i,KH}
= ΠN,s(p∗H,s).
Thus, if vH − p∗H,s ≥ vR− pR, we have Π∗s >ΠN,s(p∗H,s).
Second, consider the case of vH − p∗H,s < vR − pR, so that when the firm does not offer upgrades but can
optimize the high-quality product price, consumers book regular products. Suppose the firm offers upgrades
at price p= p∗H,s− pR. Since vR− pR > vH − p∗H,s, consumers’ utility from booking regular products without
upgrades, vR−pR, dominates their utility from booking high-quality products, vH−pH , as well as their utility
from booking regular products and accepting upgrade offers, q∗(t)[vH−pR−(p∗H,s−pR)]+[1−q∗(t)](vR−pR).
Then, we have Π∗s ≥Πs(p∗H,s− pR) =ΠN,s(p∗H,s). ¤
Appendix B: Revenue Function in the Stochastic Model
In this section, we derive the stochastic revenue function. To differentiate the demand processes from the
ones used in Section 4 where we derive the consumer booking equilibrium (which are the number of other
consumers as seen by the acting consumer), we use N∗i (t), i =H,U,R, instead of the previous Ni(t|q∗(·))
to denote the demand processes for the firm when the consumer booking equilibrium is q∗(·). Since now we
are analyzing from the firm’s perspective, the environmental equivalence property does not apply, hence the
“+1” term in the stopping times does not exist. Again, to represent this difference, we use τ∗H , τ
∗
R, τ
∗
T , τˆ
∗, and
τ∗ to denote the stopping times. Moreover, denote N ′H(t) as the demand process for high-quality products
after regular products are fully booked (N ′H(t) is a Poisson process with rate λ
a
H). Similarly, denote N
′
R(t)
as the demand process for regular products after high-quality products are fully booked (N ′R(t) is a Poisson
process with rate λaR). The expected revenue in the stochastic model, Πs(p), is as follows:
Πs(p) = E
N∗
H
(t),N∗
U
(t),N∗
R
(t)
{
pR [N∗R(τ
∗)+N∗U(τ
∗)]+ pmin{N∗U(τ∗),KH −N∗H(τ∗)}+ pHN∗H(τ∗)
+1{τ∗ = τ∗R}pH E
N′
H
(T−τ∗)
[
min{N ′H(T − τ∗),KH −N∗H(τ∗)−N∗U(τ∗)}
]
+1{τ∗ = τ∗H}pR E
N′
R
(T−τ∗)
[
min{N ′R(T − τ∗),KR−N∗U(τ∗)−N∗R(τ∗)}
]}
.
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Now we further expand the above revenue function. Πs(p) can be written as Πs(p) = Πs1(p) + Πs2(p) +
Πs3(p)+Πs4(p), where
Πs1(p) = P(τ∗H ≤ τ∗T , τ∗H ≤ T )Πs(p|τ∗H ≤ τ∗T , τ∗H ≤ T ),
Πs2(p) = P(τ∗R ≤ τ∗T , τ∗R ≤ T )Πs(p|τ∗R ≤ τ∗T , τ∗R ≤ T ),
Πs3(p) = P(τ∗H > τ∗T , τ∗R > τ∗T , τ∗T ≤ T )Πs(p|τ∗H > τ∗T , τ∗R > τ∗T , τ∗T ≤ T ),
Πs4(p) = P(τ∗H >T, τ∗R >T, τ∗T >T )Πs(p|τ∗H >T, τ∗R >T, τ∗T >T ).
Each part of Πs(p) is derived as follows:
Πs1(p) =
∫ T
0
fτ∗
H
(t)
KR−1∑
iR=0
KR−iR∑
iU=0
P(N∗R(t) = iR)P(N∗U(t) = iU)
·
{
pR(iR+ iU)+ pHKH + pR E
N′
R
(T−t)
[
min{N ′R(T − t),KR− iR− iU}
]}
dt,
where fτ∗
H
(t) = P(N∗H(t) =KH − 1)λξ∗H(t).
Πs2(p) =
∫ T
0
fτ∗
R
(t)
KH−1∑
iH=0
KH−iH∑
iU=0
P(N∗H(t) = iH)P(N∗U(t) = iU)
·
{
pR(KR+ iU)+ piU + pHiH + pH E
N′
H
(T−t)
[
min{N ′H(T − t),KH − iH − iU}
]}
dt,
where fτ∗
R
(t) = P(N∗R(t) =KR− 1)λξ∗R(t).
Πs3(p) =
∫ T
0
fτ∗
T
(t)
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
(
KH +KR
iH
)(
KH +KR− iH
iR
){
E
0≤s≤t
[ξ∗H(s)]
}iH {
E
0≤s≤t
[ξ∗R(s)]
}iR
·
{
E
0≤s≤t
[ξ∗U(s)]
}KH+KR−iH−iR [
pR(KH +KR− iH)+ p(KH − iH)+ pHiH
]
dt,
where fτ∗
T
(t) = P(N∗H(t)+N∗U(t)+N∗R(t) =KR+KH − 1)λ [ξ∗H(t)+ ξ∗U(t)+ ξ∗R(t)].
Πs4(p) =
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
KH+KR−iH−iR−1∑
iU=0
P(N∗H(T ) = iH)P(N∗R(T ) = iR)P(N∗U(T ) = iU)
·
[
pR(iR+ iU)+ pmin{iU ,KH − iH}+ pHiH
]
.
Appendix C: Last-Minute Upgrades
In this section, we introduce the (stochastic) model when the firm offers last-minute upgrades, and derive
the consumer booking equilibrium and the firm’s optimal revenue. To avoid too much repetition, we keep
the description of the model elements that are same as the conditional upgrade model to a minimum, and
we focus on explaining notations that are new to or different from the conditional upgrade model.
The firm offers upgrades and announces the upgrade price at the end of the booking period (e.g., during
check-in) instead of in advance. Consistent with the conditional upgrade model, the firm offers upgrades to γ
proportion of consumers (and consumers know whether they will be offered upgrades or not). Also consistent
with the conditional upgrade model, the firm can overbook regular products during the booking period.
However, if there are more consumers who do not accept the upgrade offers (i.e., they choose to consume
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the regular products) than the remaining capacity of regular products by the end of the booking period,
the firm incurs a penalty cost c per consumer from “bumping” these consumers. At the end of the booking
period, the firm chooses the upgrade price p≤ pH − pR based on its belief about the probabilities that the
consumers who have booked regular products will accept upgrade offers.
During the booking period, consumers choose which product type to book (high-quality or regular) or not
to book any product. When making booking decisions, consumers anticipate the optimal upgrade price that
is going to be chosen by the firm at the end of the booking period as well as the corresponding upgrade
probability on every sample path of consumers’ arrival and booking processes. More specifically, consumers’
rational expectations take into account the following: 1) the probability that upgrades will be offered at the
end of the booking period (because the firm has unsold high-quality products by then), 2) the probability
that the consumer will be willing to accept the upgrade offer (because the upgrade price that the firm
charges is low enough), 3) the probability that the consumer will get upgraded if more consumers are willing
to accept upgrade offers than the remaining capacity of high-quality products (same as in our conditional
upgrade model, we assume random rationing in this case).
Let at(vR, vH) denote the consumer’s utility-maximizing decision if she arrives at time t, has valua-
tions (vR, vH) and will be offered an upgrade. at(vR, vH) = H represents booking a high-quality product,
at(vR, vH) =R represents booking a regular product (the consumer later may or may not accept the upgrade
offer), at(vR, vH) =N represents not booking any product. We now use the fixed-point approach to derive the
consumer booking equilibrium. Suppose all other consumers except the acting consumer are using strategy
at(vR, vH). For the acting consumer, given that both product types are still available by her arrival time t, her
utility from booking a high-quality product is vH−pH which does not depend on other consumers’ strategies
used in the consumer booking game. Let uR(at(vR, vH)) denote the acting consumer’s expected utility from
booking a regular product upon arrival. uR(at(vR, vH)) incorporates the potential utility gained from being
upgraded at the end of the booking period. Let b(at(vR, vH)) denote the resulting optimal strategy for the
acting consumer. Then,
b(at(vR, vH)) =
H if vH − pH ≥ uR(at(vR, vH)) and vH ≥ pH ;R if vH − pH <uR(at(vR, vH)) and uR(at(vR, vH))≥ 0;N otherwise.
The equilibrium condition is that for every t and every (vR, vH), we must have b(at(vR, vH)) = at(vR, vH). The
strategy space has three dimensions, namely, the arrival time dimension, and the two valuation dimensions.
Note that different from the conditional upgrade model, we cannot reduce the strategy space to only the
arrival time dimension by equivalently defining the anticipated upgrade probability as the strategy used by
consumers in the booking game, because with last-minute upgrades, consumers’ probabilities to actually get
upgraded also depend on their valuations. If vH − vR is lower than the upgrade price announced at the end
of the booking period, the consumer will not accept the upgrade offer, and hence the upgrade probability is
zero; another consumer with vH − vR higher than the upgrade price will have a higher upgrade probability
in expectation.
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Given at(vR, vH), the probabilities of any other consumer that will be offered an upgrade booking each
type of product are as follows:
ξγH(t|at(vR, vH)) =
∫∫
Ω
1{at(vR, vH) =H}f(vR, vH)dvR dvH ,
ξγR(t|at(vR, vH)) =
∫∫
Ω
1{at(vR, vH) =R}f(vR, vH)dvR dvH .
The probabilities of any other consumer that will not be offered an upgrade booking each type of product
are as follows:
ξ′H(t) =
∫∫
Ω
1{a′t(vR, vH) =H}f(vR, vH)dvR dvH ,
ξ′R(t) =
∫∫
Ω
1{a′t(vR, vH) =R}f(vR, vH)dvR dvH ,
where a′t(vR, vH) denotes the utility-maximizing decision of a consumer that will not be offered an upgrade:
a′t(vR, vH) =
H if vH − vR ≥ pH − pR and vH ≥ pH ,R if vH − vR < pH − pR and vR ≥ pR,N otherwise.
The arrival processes of other consumers,NH(t|at(vR, vH)) andNR(t|at(vR, vH)), are Poisson processes with
rates λH(t|at(vR, vH)) = λγξγH(t|at(vR, vH))+λ(1−γ)ξ′H(t) and λR(t|at(vR, vH)) = λγξγR(t|at(vR, vH))+λ(1−
γ)ξ′R(t), respectively. The stopping time of the booking game is τ(at(vR, vH)) =min{τˆ(at(vR, vH)), T}, where
τˆ(at(vR, vH)) = min{τH(at(vR, vH)), τT (at(vR, vH))}, and τH(at(vR, vH)) = inf{t ≥ 0 : NH(t|at(vR, vH)) ≥
KH}, τT (at(vR, vH)) = inf{t≥ 0 :NH(t|at(vR, vH))+NR(t|at(vR, vH))+ 1≥KH +KR}.
uR(at(vR, vH)) is derived as follows:
uR(at(vR, vH)) = E
NH(t|at(vR,vH)),NR(t|at(vR,vH))|NH(t|at(vR,vH))<KH ,NH(t|at(vR,vH))+NR(t|at(vR,vH))<KH+KR{
1{t≤ τ(at(vR, vH))} ·
{
1{τ(at(vR, vH)) = τH(at(vR, vH))} · (vR− pR)+
1{τ(at(vR, vH)) 6= τH(at(vR, vH))} ·
[
(1− q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH))+ 1)) · (vR− pR)+
q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH))+ 1) · (vH − vR− p∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH))+ 1))
]}}
.
q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1) is the probability that the acting consumer accepts the upgrade
offer and gets upgraded on any sample path, p∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH))+1) is the optimal upgrade
price chosen by the firm at the end of the booking period based on demand realizations on any sample
path. The “+1” term represents the acting consumer. Note that consistent with the conditional upgrade
model, in the above derivation, the expectation taken over each sample path is conditional expectation (i.e.,
conditional on that up to the acting consumer’s arrival time, both product types are still available).
Next, we derive q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1) and p∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1).
We have
q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH))+ 1) = 1{vH − vR ≥ p∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH))+ 1)} ·
NR(τ(at(vR,vH))|at(vR,vH))∑
i=0
P(i other consumers accept upgrades) ·min
{
[KH −NH(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH))]+
i+1
,1
}
.
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We still need to derive P(i other consumers accept upgrades). Let ηt(p|at(vR, vH)) denote the probability that
a consumer who arrives at time t and books a regular product will accept the upgrade offer with upgrade
price p. We have
ηt(p|at(vR, vH)) =
∫∫
Ω
1{at(vR, vH) =R}1{vH − vR ≥ p}f(vR, vH)dvR dvH
ξγR(t|at(vR, vH))
.
Further, define η(p|at(vR, vH)) =E
t
ηt(p|at(vR, vH)). We assume that the acting consumer anticipates the other
consumers’ acceptance of the upgrade offers as a binomial distribution with probability η(p|at(vR, vH)).11
Thus, P(i other consumers accept upgrades) =
∑NR(τ(at(vR,vH))|at(vR,vH))
j=i
(
NR(τ(at(vR,vH))|at(vR,vH))
j
)
γj(1 −
γ)NR(τ(at(vR,vH))|at(vR,vH))−j
(
j
i
)
[η(p|at(vR, vH))]i[1− η(p|at(vR, vH))]j−i.
p∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1) is the maximizer of the net revenue earned at check-in,
which is the difference between the revenue from collecting upgrade fees and the cost from bump-
ing consumers due to insufficient regular product capacity. When τ(at(vR, vH)) 6= τH(at(vR, vH)), let
ΠT (p|NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH))+1) denote the firm’s expected net revenue from selling upgrades at
check-in on any sample path. We have
ΠT (p|NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH))+ 1) =
NR(t|at(vR,vH))+1∑
i=0
P(i other consumers accept upgrades)·{
p ·min{i, [KH −NH(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH))]+}
− c ·{NR(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH))+ 1−min{i, [KH −NH(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH))]+}−KR}+}.
P(i other consumers accept upgrades) is calculated using the same approach when we
derive q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1). Note that when τ(at(vR, vH)) = τH(at(vR, vH))
(so NH(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH)) = KH), p∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1) and
ΠT (p|NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1) are irrelevant, because the firm does not earn any rev-
enue from upgrades (also, the firm does not incur penalty cost, because τ(at(vR, vH)) = τH(at(vR, vH))
implies that the firm does not overbook regular products). Moreover, in this case, we naturally have
q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH))+ 1) = 0.
We have characterized the consumer book equilibrium. Then, we can calculate the firm’s optimal expected
revenue, Π∗LM,s, as follows:
Π∗LM,s = E
N∗
H
(t),N∗
R
(t)
{
pRN
∗
R(τ
∗)+ pHN∗H(τ
∗)+1{τ∗ 6= τ∗H} ·ΠT (p∗(N∗H(t),N∗R(t))|N∗H(t),N∗R(t))
+1{τ∗ = τ∗H}·R E
N′
R
(T−τ∗)
[
min{N ′R(T − τ∗),KR−N∗R(τ∗)}
]}
.
11An alternative way is to allow the acting consumer to form a heterogeneous binomial belief about
the acceptance of the upgrade offer from each of the other consumers. For any other consumer with
arrival time tj(j = 1,2, ...,NR(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH))), the probability of accepting the upgrade offer is
ηtj (p
∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1)|at(vR, vH)), where t1, t2, ..., tNR(τ(at(vR,vH ))|at(vR,vH )) denote the
arrival times of other consumers who have booked regular products on any sample path. By using this approach, the
computational burden of P(i other consumers accept upgrades) is significantly larger. The approach we take can be
considered as an approximation by assuming that consumers have limited computational capability in the booking
game. If the problem size is large enough, the equilibrium booking strategy of consumers becomes time-independent,
in which case our approach produces the same result as this alternative approach (the examples we give in the paper
have large enough problem sizes so that this occurs).
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The revenue function can be expanded conditional on τ∗ in the same way as the revenue function from
conditional upgrades in Appendix B.
